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Abstract 
This thesis examines a question of normative labour in the prospect of structural 
unemployment caused by advanced task automation. The normative concept of labour 
is explored through a theological materialist framework based on Walter Benjamin’s 
essay, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1936). This is 
developed through a two-fold investigation, which entails interpreting normative 
articulations and material descriptions of labour in primary historical philosophical 
and theological sources spanning from Aristotle to Hannah Arendt. The issue of 
automation is approached primarily through a descriptive analysis of the findings of 
Frey/Osborne (2013) and Brynjolfsson/McAfee (2011, 2014) regarding 
computerisation/robotics and related implications for labour markets of the Global 
North. The historically derived normative concept of labour is then discussed in the 
context of an automated future scenario. This discussion is then framed in a 
dialectical structure, which unfolds to propose a re-politicisation of public life. 
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Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2015 I participated in writing a paper on unemployment discourses in 
Denmark. It was a fitting time for such a study, as the Danish parliamentary parties 
were preparing for a general election, where central themes involved welfare policies 
and unemployment benefits – a great deal of this discourse revolved around reducing 
social benefits so as to incentivise waged labour. We examined both party policies 
and the surrounding public media discourse from this four-month period, using an 
analytic framework derived from Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.1 Although I had, 
prior to the study, somewhat informed intuitions regarding central normative 
conceptions of labour and unemployment, I gained considerable perspective on the 
matter, forming suspicions regarding the philosophical, ideological and theological 
background of said conceptions. Unfortunately, due to both disciplinary and length 
constraints it was not possible to explore these leads. Thus, the motivation for this 
study is partly premised on pursuing some of these ideas into labour’s philosophical 
and theological conceptual history. 
 
However, during the same semester I participated in a philosophical reading 
group/course on algorithms, and became acquainted with the present state of digital 
capabilities and developmental tendencies/projections. The course material included a 
range of social and ethical concerns related to machine learning and computerisation. 
Through a casual and extracurricular Internet perusing on algorithms, I stumbled upon 
studies examining the relationship between (un)employment and computerisation; 
two MIT papers, The Race Against the Machine2 and The Second Machine Age3 and a 
study from Oxford Martin School titled, The Future of Employment.4 Both 
investigations include detailed descriptions of automation technology. Frey and 
Osborne investigate the probability of a significant technologically enabled structural 
unemployment within the coming decades. Upon reading these papers, it seemed to 
me that mainstream labour values - inherited from for example religious, liberal and 																																																									
1 Laclau/Mouffe, 1985 
2 Brynjolfsson/ McAfee, 2011 
3 Brynjolfsson/McAfee, 2014 
4 Frey/Osborne, 2013. 
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socialist traditions - were ill suited for, and perhaps entirely incompatible with such a 
technological/labour market development. The technological/labour market 
development Frey and Osborne theorize entails social disruptions caused by the 
technological advances displacing jobs at a rate that exceeds the capacity of the labour 
market to adapt by creating new jobs. This is what the economist John Keynes named 
technological unemployment.5 Social stigmatisation of unemployment and moral 
contempt for the unemployed is at present increasingly common (ref). Whereas 
macro-economic and structural explanations of unemployment once dominated 
political discourse, these have become in recent years increasingly replaced by 
explanations centring on individualised responsibility and lack of personal and social 
virtue.6  
 
Having some background working with Critical Theory, I began thinking about 
labour normativity, in its encounter with such a technological ‘game changer’, in 
terms of a social pathology. Although this could be approached from a number of 
angles, some of which might seem more appropriate to some, I found myself 
comparing the relationship between labour and automation to that of art and 
mechanical reproducibility, as developed by Walter Benjamin in his essay, The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1936)7. Benjamin’s essay does not 
include the term social pathology; I will however argue that it is certainly contained 
as a concept. The present study’s analytical approach and title are inspired by and 
indebted to Benjamin’s thinking. Such thinking does not entail anything resembling a 
rigorous and consistent methodology, nor the careful crafting of airtight arguments. 
Benjamin’s approach, which I attempt to emulate, is rather something more like a 
hybrid collection of interesting ways of thinking about interesting topics – a 
philosophical toolbox so to say. However, if I were to define Benjamin’s method in 
terms of a unified theory, I would call it theological materialism. This will be 
clarified further on. 
 
For the purposes of investigating this posited analogy between Benjamin’s art theory 
and normative labour/automation, I examine a history of philosophical/theological 																																																									
5 Keynes, 1963: 361 
6 Christensen/Thomsen, 2015 
7 Benjamin, 1999 
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texts, and from these seek to derive both normative and descriptive labour concepts to 
be used later in a dialectical approach.  The point this exercise is to analyse and 
understand each of these concepts within their own unique historical-cultural and 
material contexts – to evaluate the development of these concepts in the course of 
material history and in scholarly interpretation. The process of selection regarding this 
literature is largely based their historical-dialectical connections.  
The ultimate interest of this thesis, beyond that of mere philosophical exegesis, is to 
explore the relationship between normative labour concepts and the material 
conditions of production through labour-saving technologies. Of specific interest is 
that of late-modern labour normativity in a projected confrontation with advanced and 
accelerative task automation. 
 
Field of Inquiry 
 
For the sake of clarity, I will initially define labour as a form of productive activity a 
person or group undertakes to maintain and reproduce the material conditions of life. 
As a primary factor in providing the means to life, labour as a class of activities is 
ascribed both functional-material and normative-social value. The procurement of 
life’s basic necessities - food, clothing, shelter etc., has always been, and remains as 
such, a primary concern of labour. Simply put, significant quantities of labour have 
always been necessary for supporting life, and thus normative evaluations of labour 
appear to be traditionally premised on this fact. However, clever developments in 
social organisation and technology have consistently amplified productive output 
while reducing labour inputs, thus generating surplus. As surplus-producing material 
conditions developed over time, so have a diversity of social norms. I assume that 
such initial surpluses enabled firstly divisions of labour types (e.g. productive, 
reproductive/affective), and secondly the subsequent or parallel establishment of 
labour-exempt social roles (e.g. deliberative, combative, religious). Also, the 
increases of productive output and decreases in labour input have, in many senses and 
within many contexts, altered the ‘nature’ of labour – where the ‘nature’ of labour has 
transitioned from producing and reproducing the basic conditions to life, to being 
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significantly embedded in service, experience economy, leisure/travel, 
communication, knowledge work etc.8  
 
The former begs the question - what may be considered to be a surplus generating/ 
labour saving technology? To this I offer a four-part ontological categorisation of 
‘labour-saving technologies’: firstly: conceptual technology e.g. precepts, concepts, 
tokens, symbols, epistemologies, knowledge, discourse, etc. Secondly: social 
technologies e.g. social structures and categories, cultural institutions, norms, 
organisational logic etc. Thirdly: physical/mechanical e.g. cranes, windmills, horses, 
motors, etc. Lastly, the category where the previous three coalesce: digital 
computation and robotics. In many situations, these categories intersect in application.  
This study is interesting in locating samples of textual evidence, which may provide 
indications of how the historical development of labour’s material conditions have 
been considered – and how developments in said labour-saving technologies, in their 
relation to social structures, have been normatively evaluated. In other words, this 
thesis seeks to explore the development of the relationship between labour’s 
historical-material function and its social-ethical status. 
 
Labour has acquired in the course of history, a great deal of recognition for its 
capacity to facilitate personal identity, constitute the primary context for performing 
these identities, and even provide a sense of existential meaning.9 In our late-
modernity, participation in the labour market is often linked to conflated heuristics of 
individual virtues and social responsibility e.g. self-sufficiency, autonomy, and social-
contribution.10 These factors contribute to making late-modern unemployment, not 
only a material resource issue, but also one of jeopardised self-worth and social 
recognition. As such, labour is one of the key definers of social status, community 
inclusion, legitimacy, self-esteem, social merit, etc. – forming not the formal, but 
nonetheless often implied social-normative requirement for deserving citizenship and 
dignity.11 
 																																																									
8 Wren, 2013 
9 Christensen/Thomsen, 2015 
10 IBID. 
11 IBID. 
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These factors regarding labour’s material function and social significance are 
presently becoming increasingly questionable. This is partly in relation to a growing 
precarity12 and labour market polarisation/inequality ushered by globalisation13, 
deindustrialisation, the proliferation of toxic financial products14, and the ‘jobless 
recovery’ from the 2008 financial crisis.15 Furthermore, as presented in the 
introduction, advanced labour saving technologies are often seen as having a great 
disruptive potential – a potential that is increasingly attracting popular and scholarly 
attention. 
  
The actual and potential capabilities of a range of technologies, including amongst 
others machine learning (ML), machine vision, and mobile robotics – all of which 
make increasingly effective use of big data - are commonly described as ‘disruptive’ 
in reference to their projected social impact on already precarious globalised labour 
markets (e.g. Frey/Osborne 2013, Brynjolfsson/McAfee, 2011/2014). When these 
‘disruptive’ capabilities are considered with projected logarithmic growth rates, the 
material and social implications become quite difficult to fathom. This situation has 
recently been referred to as ‘the fourth industrial revolution’16. 
 
Whereas the preceding industrial revolutions had profound, and indeed highly 
disruptive economic, political and social impacts, the growth rates were linear and 
unfolded over generations – not exponential and intragenerational. It follows that the 
projected disruptions of the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, with an emphasis on 
destabilisation of employment as a primary system in deciding and justifying resource 
allocation, could outpace and confound proposals for adaptation that conform to 
conventional systemic logics and/or social norms (job creation via economic growth, 
conventional fiscal policies aimed at stimulating investment, etc.). Therefore, it might 
prove necessary to adopt economic, political and social strategies of adaptation that 
facilitate rapid change, even insofar as such strategies might entail revisions of 
common moral and political concepts, theories and institutions. Thus, there is a range 																																																									
12 Standing, 2011 
13 Piketty, 2013   
14 Horner, 2011 
15 IBID. 
16 Mesnard, 2016  
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of moral and political questions to be considered. These include issues of redefining 
‘the good life’ under new conditions, evaluating these conditions to determine how 
socially valued activity and contribution may be facilitated, taking in account 
questions of individual identity and merit, distributive justice, and not least of all 
discipline and political power.  
 
Aside from the concept of labour, the following analysis will also explore a number of 
tangential concepts, including the ‘the good life’, the metaphysics of ownership, 
autonomy and heteronomy, citizenship, alienation, merit, as well as the precept of 
‘human nature’ and its role in theorising/justifying the opposing social dynamics of 
competition and collaboration. 
As much as it would be preferable to explore all of these matters in greater detail, this 
will naturally not be possible. This study will endeavour to address the breadth of 
these historical, inter-disciplinary, and highly multi-casual issues, economically and 
coherently. 
 
Hypothesis 
 
In place of basing this study on a problem formulation, I use as a point of departure a 
working hypothesis. This hypothesis is structured by way of analogy. For Benjamin, 
the concept and function of art is altered upon becoming mechanically reproducible. 
From the moment of this alteration, there are normative inclinations for restoring - by 
means of reconfiguration - art to its former privileged status and function: this 
inclination produces the negative theology of l’art pour l’art – art for the sake of art’s, 
which Benjamin argues, leads to the ‘aesthetisation of politics’. Similarly, I propose 
that the concept and purpose of labour is altered upon becoming subject to 
automation. Furthermore, I assume that there are resilient social-normative 
inclinations for maintaining labour’s status and purpose; this entails maintenance of 
the validity of labour as a primary mechanism of allocating material goods and 
recognition. The conservation of this mechanism would seem to bolster justification 
of the legitimacy of inherited social structures, wealth, privilege and hierarchical 
power relations. I propose that this conservative approach produces the negative 
theology of (life as) labour for the sake of labour, which entails an
		 8	
instrumentalization of life and generates forms of de-humanising social exclusion. 
This negative theology may be seen as an important factor of an existing social 
pathology, one that digital automation has the potential to further aggravate. A 
potential solution, or ‘remedy’, may be sought within conceptions of ‘the good life’, 
which this thesis argues ought to be deployed in constructing social applications for 
automation technologies – in other words, which should be directed towards the 
facilitation of living for the sake of living well, and thereby address the problematic 
dichotomy of autonomy and community. 	
Strategy of Analysis 
 
The structure of this thesis and its analytical framework is inspired by the structure of 
Benjamin’s artwork essay. Although this structure is not slavishly reproduced, it is at 
all times present as inspiration and orientation. This study approaches these questions 
by contextualising labour as a historically and culturally developed concept – or more 
precisely, as a range of concepts, informed by historical and material realities, and 
developed and canonised within influential and authoritive texts from various 
scholarly/cultural traditions.  These texts have primarily been selected through a 
process of following referential leads. I began working from the assumption that for 
example Karl Marx, Christian theology, and ancient Greek philosophy all contained 
articulations of normative labour concepts. Furthermore, I began from the assumption 
that the labour concepts expressed within these texts continue to play a role in 
informing late-modern normative concepts of labour in European cultures. Both 
normative and descriptive accounts of labour are located and analysed in these texts, 
providing us with grounds for stating, not how labour actually was, but rather which 
developments and continuities of perceptions and conceptions are present in the texts.  
 
Following this, the automation problem is introduced. This is explained primarily via, 
Frey & Osborne, 2013, Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011, and 2014 - three 
interdisciplinary studies which integrate both technological and labour-economic 
research. Also, a number of contemporary references are included for the purpose of 
providing evidence of tendencies and interesting cases regarding the development of 
automation technology. These studies are selected as general samples, showing a 
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section of the present field of informed research and discourse regarding digital 
automation and its projected implications for the labour market. The majority of such 
research and discourse is situated in economic and technological knowledge, but 
human/social concerns do appear, sometimes appealing philosophers to engage with 
the social and ethical questions posed by automation.  
 
The following discussion attempts to re-frame the automation question as a relevant 
problem for the humanities – more specifically as an ethical concern relevant for 
social-philosophy, as well as a problem of conceptual discontinuity between historical 
labour and labour in the present/near future. The problem of automation is discussed 
as a problem of social normativity, where the conflict, or social disruption, is 
predicated on a social pathology - one that I hypothesise is related to the morally 
motivated conservation of inherited social norms/structures despite their 
technological/ organisational obsolescence and human costs. Following this 
pathology metaphor, a critical diagnosis is offered, and which discuses the available 
possibilities of treatment – or in plainer terms, discus what may be considered the 
most interesting proposals regarding socially responsible adaptive policies and 
strategies. 
 
Theory 
Theory of Science 
 
This thesis is concerned with formulating a normative critique of the concept of 
labour in late-modernity. It must be emphasised that present study is not concerned 
with providing a functional critique. Although this paper makes use of a range of 
historical, descriptive and predictive texts, it does not claim any direct authority to 
state what was, is, or shall be – only that which seems to be true as may be reasonably 
and justifiably derived from the selected texts. This is an interpretative work - an 
ideographic work. However, these interpretations are used to structure a normative 
argument, which does claim coherence and justification in responding to an actual 
social problem. 
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This thesis’ approach to the science of interpretation is primarily related to two 
associated epistemological traditions from the human sciences: dialectics and 
hermeneutics. This is the case, as the investigation is approached through inspiration 
from Benjamin’s theological materialism, which it may be argued, entails both 
schools. Although hermeneutics is commonly associated to the philosophies of 
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt et al., this 
thesis does not attempt to emulate the hermeneutic methodology of these scholars. 
Rather, it is Benjamin’s interpretative tendencies this paper imitates. In this sense, 
textual evidence is approached as fragmented, contingent and contextual knowledge. 
This study’s hermeneutic analysis is approached through thinking about matters as 
they are revealed through text, and sunders between interpretation and truth-value. 
Ultimately, such interpretation is applied for the purpose of reconsidering and thus 
redefining for contemporary relevance, philosophy, history, myth, allegory, doctrine 
etc. 
 
Dialectics have a role in this thesis largely through the framing of the investigation as 
a two-fold - normative and material – axis of philosophical-historical explanation. 
Furthermore, this thesis’ structure, aside from mimicking Benjamin, may be seen in 
terms of the three-stage dialectical process of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis – the 
inheritance of tradition, the shattering of tradition, and recomposition through a novel 
proposal/claim. A dialectical approach is also present in terms of presupposing a 
relationship between ontological concepts and perception, between the normative and 
the technological. In restructured Marxian terms, a co-constructive relationship is 
conceived between the socio-cultural superstructure and the material-economic base. 
In this sense, concepts, linguistic structures, and pre-theoretical categories have 
reciprocal relationships with the material – where neither are permitted status as 
mono-causal determinants. 
 
Although it is common and fashionable in these times to assume as a universal truth-
value Nietzsche’s famous slogan, ‘there is no such thing as truth, only 
interpretations’, this seems to me, in an unrestricted form, to be epistemologically and 
politically debilitating. A restricted form of the hermeneutic-dialectical approach 
recently came to my attention in an interview article with lecturer Morten Thanning – 
and I should like to think that the epistemology of this thesis - to a degree - reflects 
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such an approach: “Jeg forsøger at fastholde sandhed uden en privilgeret position.”17 
In my own terms, I subject my interpretations to considerations – not codified criteria 
– of validity and justification without resorting to a concept of objective truth. 
Following this approach, I do take responsibility for my interpretations as judgements, 
and the normative argument that follows. 
 
Benjamin’s theological materialism  
 
I view Benjamin’s scholarship as an interpretive bridge between classical and late 
modernity, and between (religious) idealism and (historical) materialism. The implicit 
reasoning for invoking Benjamin’s scholarship is that his insights seem to maintain 
significance for understanding the configuration and dynamics of late modernity. He 
integrates the secular materialism of Marxian thought with the poetic, literary and 
religious imagination, painting a kaleidoscope of philosophy, cultural theory, literary 
and art/architecture criticism. Benjamin writes with a keen awareness of the 
importance of culture, and the power of interpretive conceptions of tradition – 
aesthetic, ethical and theological - to effect political and material reality. This effect is 
perhaps most distinct and concentrated in the chess-playing automaton image from 
the Theses on History, where the ‘wizened and unsightly’ theology subtly pre-
determines the telos of historical materialism and the normative application of 
technology.18  
Benjamin’s usage of ‘theology’ may be interpreted to mean an interpretive 
intertextual tradition – one that over the course of time, reinvents the normative 
relevance of inherited culture, as in allegory, myth, literature, art, etc., – but also 
philosophy. In this sense Benjamin revives a form of philosophical idealism, but 
hybridises it with materialist criticism to mature – to abandon dogma, orthodoxy, and 
ontologically privileged concepts and categories – but also to avoid the pitfalls of 
rationalist and empiricist epistemic hubris/intellectual imperialism, especially the 
doctrine of civilizational progress for the sake of progress. As Buck-Morss describes: 
“For Benjamin, theology functions as an axis philosophical experience (…) Without 																																																									
17 Haug, 2016  
18 Benjamin, 1999: 245 
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theology (the axis of transcendence) Marxism falls into positivism; without Marxism 
(the axis of empirical history) theology falls into magic.”19  
 
On Benjamin’s methodology  
 
Benjamin begins the essay with a clear historical materialist methodology, noting the 
discrepancy between the transformational tempi of the Marxist categories of base and 
super-structure. He uses the scholarship of Marx as a benchmark of industrial time, 
when “(…) this mode of production was in its infancy (…)”20 The superstructure, he 
writes, has lagged behind the base, taking “(…) more than a half-century to manifest 
in all areas of culture the change in the conditions of production.”21 In the tradition 
of Marx’ empiricism, Benjamin states that the purpose of his essay, is not to speculate 
about the role of proletarian art after the revolution, or the forms of art in a ‘classless 
society’, but rather “(…) about the developmental tendencies of art under present 
conditions of production.”22 Benjamin considered that the insights derived from an 
imprudent materialist analysis could bear a potential to be ‘weaponised’. This is to 
say, to be used for the “ (…) processing of data in the fascist sense.”23 Benjamin 
states that his theory of art - his concept of the role of art – is formulated so as to be 
useless for fascism: opposed to this, he writes that he conceived his theory for the 
purpose of being “(…) useful for the formulation of revolutionary demands in the 
politics of art.”24 
Benjamin’s essay demonstrates a consistent materialist thinking, but in revised form, 
concocting not only a humanist antidote to the militant glamour of fascist aesthetics, 
but also the positivist leanings of orthodox Marxist theory, namely the economic 
determinism of historical materialism – that the economic base determines the socio-
cultural superstructure. Surely, Benjamin accepts the transformational power of 
developments in ‘modes of production’ and general technology. He also, however, 
emphasises the simultaneous importance of ideas and sensory experience – 																																																									
19 Buck-Morss, 1989: 248-249 
20 Benjamin, 1999: 211 
21 Benjamin, 1999: 212 
22 IBID. 
23 IBID. 
24 IBID. 
		 13	
(ap)perceptual, conceptual, and normative – as crucial components in a dialectical 
feedback loop. This loop is comprised of ‘mode of production’, human 
experience/observation, the aesthetic-ethical imagination and interpretive/immaterial 
metaphysics. Support for this claim is providing in the following section. 
On the development of reproduction techniques 
 
Benjamin provides a brief history of the reproducibility of artwork. He explains that 
the technique of art reproduction has historically been a well-known and widely used 
technique. The first, and primary instance of this may be seen in simple imitation – 
transmitting techniques as traditions or idioms of a particular workshop/artisan; also 
the manual copying of works as forgeries.25 The ancient Greeks were able to 
technically reproduce by means of metal casting and stamping, which allowed for 
‘mass’ production of bronzes, terracottas, and coins.26 
 
When woodcutting technique emerged, graphic art in quantity was enabled. This was 
followed by the advent of the Guttenberg’s printing press. In conjunction, the printing 
press and printed graphics, from woodcuts, engraving, etching and lithography 
formed the productive basis for historic social transformations predicated on literacy 
and information. By these means, the recording and dissemination of information 
became faster, more efficient and vastly cheaper.27 Benjamin comments on how 
lithography made it possible, on account of the low expense of its reproducibility, for 
high volume printing to include graphic depictions of ‘every-day life’.28 This 
development played an obviously large role facilitating the popularity of newspapers. 
When photography emerged the possibilities for mass public media accelerated and 
widened at an ever-greater pace.29 
 
  
																																																									
25 Benjamin: 1999: 212 
26 IBID. 
27 IBID. 
28 IBID. 
29 IBID. 
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The transformation of art and experience 
 
One of Benjamin’s reoccurring observations on the medium of photography – and by 
implication, film – is that possibilities for representing social realities expanded. 
These media also established themselves eventually as valid and prestigious methods 
in their own right. Furthermore, what had been previously neglected objects and 
subjects of perception were introduced as possibilities, and in some cases as genres.30 
Representation through photography and film could keep pace with events and with 
speech; and crucially, works produced via these media could be reproduced without 
the copies being perceivable as copies, or being judged less authentic by being copies. 
As an example, the photographic negative could be said to be the truly original work, 
whereas the first print would have an indistinguishable value and quality from the 
tenth print, as so on.31 This is described by Benjamin as the destruction of the aura, 
which refers to the ritual-cultic authority (as use-value) embedded in a work by virtue 
of its authenticity and its unique existence in time and space. This destruction happens 
in two important senses: firstly by virtue of the original work – e.g. a photographic 
negative or audio master – itself being a mere template – as merely the first copy of 
many intended copies. Secondly, the aura is destroyed by virtue of the copied work’s 
ability to enter into situations that would be impossible for say an original painting or 
a symphony orchestra. Examples of this could be simultaneous film screenings at 
distant locations, or a symphony played in a small home. The social implications of 
such media are vast, to cite Benjamin:  
 
“These two processes lead to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the 
obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind. Both processes are 
intimately connected with the contemporary mass movements.”32 
 
Although it might initially be tempting to, at least partially, interpret Benjamin’s 
description of the aura’s destructions as a kind of nostalgic lament, such an 
interpretation would be a blunder. There were indeed conspicuous tendencies of such 
nostalgia, which formed the core of what Benjamin considered to be a reactionary 																																																									
30 Benjamin, 1999: 213-214 
31 IBID. 
32 Benjamin, 1999: 215 
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theory and development of art, or what he called the negative theology of l´art pour 
l´art. I would claim that art for art’s sake – art as an industry abstracted from 
considerations of social function other than that tokenising social status and producing 
appreciating fetish commodities - maintains, at least in the realm of the ‘fine arts’, a 
prominent status within present day conceptions of aesthetics.  
 
In opposition to this doctrine, Benjamin rejoices in the aura’s destruction. He writes 
that mechanical reproduction has emancipated “the work of art from its parasitical 
dependence on ritual.”33 Crucially, the shifting criterion of art’s use value – from 
authenticity in ritual, to reproducibility in mass communication – reverses the 
function of art: “Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another 
practice – politics.”34 This new situation was however not without problematic 
complications. 
 
A particular analogy from the artwork essay is indicative of such complications. 
Benjamin considers the difference between a cameraman and a painter, and compares 
this relationship to that of a surgeon and a (healer) magician. He explains that a 
magical healer maintains a distance to the sick person – a distance that is enforced by 
the magician’s spiritual authority. The surgeon eliminates such a distance - both 
physical and perceptual – by ‘penetrating’ into the patient.35 
 
The meaning and relevance of this analogy requires interpretation. The film, for 
Benjamin the most potent and significant modern art medium, changes the conditions 
of perception and apperception of reality. Such is the power of phantasmagoria – the 
spectacle as a mass social anaesthetic. Similar to Marx’s fetish object, the 
phantasmagoria must maintain its illusion by hiding the traces of its production – ‘an 
aspect of reality that is free from all equipment’.36 
 
Film offers the masses the possibility of perceiving a uniform collective experience. 
The ‘deepening of apperception’ takes place by virtue of the film providing mass 																																																									
33 Benjamin, 1999: 218 
34 IBID. 
35 Benjamin, 1999: 226-227 
36 Buck-Morss, 1992: 22 
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simulated experiences, which function to inform future perceptions of reality. The 
object of such perception is so often a stylised embodiment of the masses themselves, 
where identification is a central success criterion for characters and environments. 
Filmic depictions of daily public life and intimate private life bear a powerful 
potential for facilitating such identification. Through such portrayals, film bears the 
quality of transforming lay viewers into ‘experts’.37 Buck-Morss describes this 
situation in terms of a tripartite perceptual division: Agent, Patient, and Observer.38  
 
Benjamin considered the event of technical mass media shattering the ritual-cultic 
tradition as an important moment – one that enabled both mass self-awareness and 
mass social deception. Mass media replaced cultural ritual as art’s use-value with that 
of politics. Such media, especially film, became potent tools for shaping perception 
and experience – demonstrating the possibility of producing social norms at speeds 
rivalling – and perhaps surpassing – the material development and determinant force 
of the economic base. Whereas Benjamin saw the mass media developments as, in a 
sense ‘progressive’, he did not consider the new situation to be anything resembling a 
desirable condition. We recall that he wishes to formulate a theory of art that is 
useless to fascism (and capitalism), whereby mass media are primarily a means of 
articulating revolutionary demands – indeed, “One of the foremost tasks of art has 
always been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only later.”39 
However, Benjamin writes that so long as Capital dominates film studios, its interests 
will determine the content and arrangement of the artwork - thus enforcing the social 
norms that are supportive of Capital and perpetuate its leverage over production and 
social life. Thus, so long as Capital runs the show, the revolutionary potential of film 
media can accomplish nothing more than, “(…) the promotion of a revolutionary 
criticism of traditional concepts of art.”40 To resolve this issue, and fully derive the 
critical value of Benjamin’s theory of art for the purposes of this study, it is necessary 
to examine the epilogue, which, it can be argued, contains the most substantial 
expression of Benjamin’s theory of ‘art’. 
 																																																									
37 Benjamin, 1999: 228 
38 Buck-Morss, 1999: 38 
39 Benjamin, 1999: 230 
40 Benjamin, 1999: 224 
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fiat ars – peareat mundus 
 
Benjamin’s considerations seem to comprise a warning concerning the hazards of 
transposing historic normativity onto new technical-material paradigms. It has 
hopefully been established that Benjamin does not think of technologies as isolated 
determinants; he does however seem to regard technologies as potentialities with 
obvious optimal affordances – affordances which, if compromised by calcified 
normative concepts, become perverse forces that threaten the human condition with 
alienation – and, in extended form, with destruction.41  
 
Benjamin chooses Marinetti’s formulations from the Futurist manifesto to 
demonstrate this logic. The manifesto is a chilling text, which explicitly caresses the 
aesthetics of mechanised, industrial war – war as art and art as war – or war as the 
highest expression of culture42 - not the aesthetics of Prussian parades and gallant 
hussars, but of trenches.43 Benjamin argues that society has not matured sufficiently 
to render technology its instrument. This is claimable by virtue of the fact that society 
has actualised the potential of its productive forces and technical abilities to achieve 
destruction through war.44 This is attributable to the ‘unnatural utilisation’ of 
productive forces, which for Benjamin entails the crisis resulting from 
‘overproduction’ and ‘lack of markets’. This crisis is predicated on the social 
dynamics established by the norms of private property, labour-as-commodity, and 
labour as the primary mechanism of allocation. It is precisely in this relationship of 
crisis - the paradoxical detriment of abundance - where we may locate the concept of 
the social pathology in Benjamin’s essay - where,“(…) instead of dropping seeds 
from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities.”45 Benjamin ends the epilogue, 
rather enigmatically, by stating, “This is the situation of politics which Fascism 
renders aesthetic. Communism responds by politicising art.”46 
 
																																																									
41 Benjamin, 1999: 234 
42 Paraphasing von Bernhardi: The Next War, 1912 
43 IBID. 
44 Benjamin, 1999: 235 
45 IBID. 
46 IBID. 
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It would seem to follow that Benjamin’s theory of art, which must be entirely useless 
for the purposes of Fascism (and through association, Capitalism), becomes rather a 
normative theory of technological application. This theory may be understood as the 
inverse of the Futurist manifesto and the ‘aesthetisation of politics’. ‘Communism’s’ 
response of politicising art is therefore not to be understood as using new media as a 
vehicle for propaganda – creating clichéd images of peasants and industrial workers – 
this is indeed ‘the processing of data in the Fascist sense’. From this alone we may 
fairly infer that Benjamin’s ‘Communism’ was not that of Stalin’s Soviet Union. 
Rather, the ‘politicising of art’ may be understood as the social utilisation of 
technology. Initially, applying aesthetic media to usher transition, through for 
example novel and utopian images - dialectical images serving as negations of fixed 
tradition. In restructured Marxian terms, mass production/media should be utilised for 
establishing the social-normative preconditions for a social appropriation and 
application of the means of production/communication. 
 
Secondly, ‘politicising art’ refers to, rather simply, confiscating the power to structure 
corporeal reality by using industrial production and communication technologies to 
eliminate scarcity and facilitate social-political relations - using planes to drop seeds, 
using machines to minimise human labour, using mass media and other ‘arts’ to 
articulate and cultivate demands for human dignity and the distribution of political 
power – to allow the implied affordances of these technologies to perform 
responsibly, thus enabling people to live an active and connected life. 
 
Let us now begin the investigation on normative labour in the age of automation, and 
see how well it may be understood through the analogy to Benjamin’s ‘art’ theory. 
We begin with a text of great historical and philosophical influence, Aristotle’s 
Politics. 
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Labour in pre-modernity 
 
Aristotle’s concept of labour 
 
In Politics, Aristotle conducts a dual investigation – on the one hand he gives an 
empirical and descriptive account of the political situation in which he lived – 
primarily, but not exclusively concerned with third century BCE Athens. On the other 
hand, the Politics is also a normative work, and is concerned with questions regarding 
the virtuous management and civic life of the city-state, or polis. It is not my intention 
to portray Aristotle in an ungenerous light – as a philosopher who argued for the 
transcendental ethical virtue of a highly hierarchal society, nor as a callous apologist 
for the reliance of the ‘gentleman’ (eleutheros) on the un-free labour of others. To his 
credit, Aristotle was concerned with theorising a realistic compromise between 
oligarchic and democratic forces, imagining a balance that could relieve the polis, 
again primarily Athens, from the misfortunes of civil strife (stasis). Equally important 
was his interest in promoting the development of human capacities - for virtue, 
excellence, wisdom etc. 
 
Aristotle understands the polis as a composite whole, made up of a variety of persons, 
classes, and professions – all of which are necessary for the polis’ function and 
welfare. Of these constituent parts, he is precise in establishing, which category of 
persons should be considered proper citizens, which should be secondary or even 
tertiary citizens, and which ought be wholly excluded from political status.47 Aristotle 
recognises that citizenship requirements would vary between different poleis, all 
having unique compositions and government types. He does however, provide us with 
his ‘unqualified’ definition of citizenship, which would seem to apply universally, 
namely the social status associated to being able to take part in political decisions and 
holding office.48 
 
																																																									
47 Aristotle, Politics: 1275a: 1-40 
48 Aristotle, Politics: 1275a: 23-24 
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This ‘partaking in decision and office’ is for Aristotle’s only fitting and proper for 
virtuous persons – virtue being a compound character trait – an aggregation of 
different forms of tempered excellence (aretê). Such virtue, Aristotle argues, is only 
attainable through education and cultivation – processes linked to the privilege of 
being exempted, or freed, from performing the ‘menial’ and unskilled chores of the 
‘labouring element’ (ergon thêtikon), the ‘vulgar’ and ‘mechanical’ tasks of artisans 
(a banausos technê), or even having ‘necessary work’, or ‘profession’ (ascholia: ‘un-
quiet’ – commonly translated as, ‘lack of leisure’49). The two following citations are 
included for their clarity in expressing the views mentioned above: 
 
“(…) the virtue of a citizen, as we have been discussing it at any rate, cannot be 
spoken of as belonging to everyone or even to every free person, but only to those 
who have been relieved of necessary sorts of work.”50 
 
And: 
 
“ (…) citizens should not live a worker’s or a merchant’s way of life, for this sort of 
way of life is ignoble and contrary to virtue. (4) Nor, indeed, should those who are 
going to be citizens in such a regime be farmers; for there is a need for leisure both 
with a view to the creation of virtue and with a view to political activities.”51 
 
Aristotle expresses a clearly unenthusiastic regard for materially necessary 
occupations that are not either ‘deliberative’ or ‘combative’.52 Aristotle’s evaluation 
of these civic categories cannot be appreciated without bearing in mind his normative 
understanding of the qualified human life-form (bios, as opposed to zoê – simply life, 
shared by Gods, animals, and humans – limited to the singular53) and its relationship 
to the polis. That which distinguishes humanity - in Aristotle’s view - is the capacity 
for logos, arête, and contemplation (nous), which are only possible in a politicised 
communal (koinon) life. Thus Aristotle defines ‘man’ as a politikon zoon (commonly 
translated as ‘social animal’ via the Latin, animal socialis – although perhaps 																																																									
49 Arendt, 1957: 15 
50 Aristotle, Politics: 1278a: 6-9 
51 Aristotle, Politics: 1329a: 37-44 
52 Aristotle, Politics: 1291a: 24-28 
53 Agamben, 1998: 4 
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political-being better grasps the original Greek54). This is to say, that the human life 
actualises its ‘social-nature’ and potential for virtue by transcending kinship structures 
and the home (oikos) becoming a political actor in an urban-centred, and 
intellectually/politically enabled public life. Even insofar as a polis is made up of 
many necessary constituent parts, some of these belong more to the polis than 
others.55 
 
However, the capacity to cultivate oneself into such a life-form, was dependant on the 
material conditions of both sustenance (trophe) production and of manufacture (for 
both necessity and ‘finer living’), which were in the third century Greek world, 
largely dependant on a labour intensive and primarily agrarian economy – an 
economy in which slavery played a highly significant role56 So it would seem that, in 
Aristotle’s descriptive account the majority of people – labourers and workers - were 
not viable candidates for achieving a ‘human’ life-form, in that such a life-form was 
dependant the freedom and ‘quietude’, which was only possible on account of the 
‘menial’ an un-free labour of others. Aristotle does not argue for an inherent 
legitimacy of such exploitation in regard to Greek labourers. He did however reflect 
on the institution of slavery insofar as it was, for some persons (or perhaps, peoples) 
‘natural’ - and in this sense to the mutual - even amicable - benefit of both master and 
the slave. In the instance of a ‘natural’, and thus defensible slavery, Aristotle 
metaphorically wrote that the slave became a part of the master’s body – ‘animate yet 
separate’57 There remains, however, an ambiguity in Aristotle concerning slavery: it is 
possible to read into his texts both anti and pro-slavery justifications58. It would seem 
that - as was often his manner – Aristotle attempted to pragmatically reconcile the 
opposing ethical-political positions with the fact that - as an economic factor - slavery 
was an indispensible institution enabling the qualified forms of bios that gentlemanly 
Greek citizens so valued. To Aristotle’s credit, and most interesting for the purposes 
of this thesis, he was able to imagine a situation in which such exploitation would not 																																																									
54 Arendt: 1998: 24 
55 Aristotle, Politics: 1291a: 24-28. 
56 De. Ste. Croix, 1981 
57 Aristotle, Politics: 1255b: 4-16 
58  As for example in the famous Valladolid debate between Sepúlveda and de Las Casas, where 
Sepúlveda’s economically convenient (mis)interpretation of Aristotle and Augustine won over de Las 
Casas, and was used as justification for the Spanish treatment of American natives. (Hanke, 1959) 
(Reynolds, 2010) 
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be required, where ‘vulgar-mechanical’ labour and (class) hierarchies – the master-
slave relationship - could be made pointless: (magical) automation: 
 
“Every subordinate, moreover, is an instrument that wields many instruments, (3) for 
if each of the instruments were able to perform its function on command or by 
anticipation, as they assert those of Daedalus did, or the tripods of Hephaestus (which 
the poet says “of their own accord came to the gods’ gathering”), so that shuttles 
would weave themselves and picks play the lyre, master craftsmen would no longer 
have a need for subordinates, or masters for slaves.”59  
 
Questions on what would become of these suddenly dispensable and redundant 
labours did not seem to occur to Aristotle, as the event of magical automation most 
likely seemed improbable. We could be excused for imagining that he would have 
welcomed them to partake as politikon zoon in the contemplative (bios theôrêtikos), 
pleasurable (bios apolaustikos) and political (bios politikos) life of citizens. 
 
To summarise, Aristotle’s conceptualizes labour primarily as ‘toil’  – that which is 
materially necessary, yet is conducive to little, if any, human virtue or excellence - 
and therefore does not and cannot be any significant part of ‘the good life’. The 
various civic activities of gentleman, including political administration, study, 
warfare, facilitating religious rituals etc., do not appear in Aristotle as relatable to his 
labour concept. They appear as quite the opposite, as free action (from the ‘quietude’ 
of schole), and insofar as they are services performed, they are for the benefit of the 
polity rather than for another person’s interests, which is according to Aristotle is 
contrary to the conditions of being free, “(…) for it is the mark of the gentleman not 
to live for the benefit of another.” (to mê pros allon zên)60 
 
It is clear that Aristotle expresses a labour concept, which is differentiated and 
stratified, yet only within the larger category of ‘menial’ labour and ‘vulgar’ 
craftsmanship. Present-day conceptions such as ‘knowledge workers’, ‘priesthood as 
vocation’, ‘career politicians’, or the public performances of a constitutional monarch 
being considered ‘labour’ or a ‘job’ would likely sound nonsensical to Aristotle, as 																																																									
59 Aristotle, Politics: 1253b33-4a 
60 Aristotle, Rhetoric I.9, 1367a 28-32 
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they would fall under what he considered to be free-political activities, leisure and 
honourable/intellectual privileges. If we then move on to the early imperial period in 
Rome, perception of such matters appear to have changed in a number of ways.  
 
On the Shortness of Life 
 
Lucius Annæus Seneca’s piece On the Shortness of Life deals with the experience of a 
lifetime in recollection and memory. Seneca’s philosophic works and methods are, 
quite unlike the structured Aristotle, rather sporadic and appear as rhetorically 
charged speeches. Seneca’s account, while not directly investigating or commenting 
the concept of labour, does deal with professional patrician occupations in an 
interesting way. The text is also valuable as an historical source, describing a range of 
values, customs, behaviours, tendencies, etc., of the early Roman principate, all of 
which play a role in conceptualising labour. 
 
Seneca is concerned with what he experiences to be a widespread tendency among his 
contemporaries to live life in such a manner where, in recollection, life appears brief 
and fleeting - leaving the old or dying with regret for not having sufficiently lived ‘the 
good life’. Seneca writes with dismay, wondering how it is possible that people 
jealously guard their material wealth, yet allow their life (in the sense of time) to 
waste in ‘idleness’ and to be claimed by others though observance of social 
convention/duties/roles. Seneca’s category of proper leisure – as opposed to what he 
considers vulgar idleness and vice - appears to be quite narrow and limited to reading 
and writing philosophy.61 Quite unlike Aristotle, Seneca describes the activities of 
privileged political/civil life as chores – burdens - as distinct from ‘proper’ leisure. 
 
Seneca tells of a particularly interesting example of the normative status of a 
maintaining a meaningful existence through having a professional role. The patrician 
functionary Sextus Turannius was relieved of his civic duties at the age of 90. 
Turannius protested his dismissal by ordering his servants to lay him in bed as a 
corpse and grieve in ritual observance. This continued until he was restored to his 																																																									
61 Seneca: 14,1: 1 
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post. Turannius clearly equated his ‘unemployment’ with death. Seneca, being critical 
of such norms, likened Turannius’ ‘labour’ to ‘being in harness’, as if a horse or mule:  
 
“Is it really such pleasure for a man to die in harness? Yet very many have the same 
feeling; their desire for their labour lasts longer than their ability (…) it is more 
difficult for men to obtain leisure from themselves than from the law.”62 
 
In another case, Seneca writes about how the emperor Augustus felt himself burdened 
by the ‘toil’ of dictatorial administration. Augustus appeared obsessed with a dream 
of private retirement, leisure, and autonomy – a dream that he as emperor was 
arguably empowered to fulfil. Yet this dream only seemed to entertain Augustus as a 
future prospect – as a potential that he never felt inclined to actualise: 
  
“Every conversation of his kept coming back to this theme, that he was hoping for 
leisure; he would relieve his toils with this sweet, even if illusory, consolation, the 
thought that one day he would live for himself”63 
 
In other passage, which appears similar to certain accounts of modernity (e.g. Sennett, 
1998), where divisions between leisure and occupation – or personal and private - are 
increasingly blurred (albeit emphasising the salience of occupation). Seneca’s 
descriptions imply that lives of his contemporaries64, speaking mostly of patricians 
and other affluent citizens, were constantly bound to some heteronomous tedium, 
where the demands of one’s profession and station pervaded even the most intimate of 
spheres; life inhibiting ‘cultivation’65 and diner parties as arenas of business: 
“Scrutinize every moment of such people's lives, and note how much time they spend 
on their ledger-keeping, how much on setting traps or fearing them, how much on 
cultivating others or being cultivated by others, how much on giving or receiving 
bail, how much on dinner parties which have themselves become business: you'll see 
																																																									
62 Seneca: 20,1: 3 
63 Seneca: 4,1: 2 
 
65In the context of the passage, I read ‘cultivation’ as both practical education, e.g. law studies, and also 
‘cultivation’ with a connotation of sophistry, e.g. the trivia of ‘Greek’ concerns, such as ‘how many 
rowers were on Odysseus’ ship?’ 
		 25	
that their affairs, whether good or bad, allow them no time to draw breath.”66 
Perhaps most central to Seneca’s critique, is the manner of experiencing the present, 
almost regardless of what it might entail, in anticipation of some future event or 
condition. Seneca insists that this is an estrangement from the present – the inability 
to truly experience - is the central fault, or vice, that leads to the perception of a short 
and dissatisfied life. Thus, it seems that Seneca’s evaluation maintains many crucial 
aspects of Aristotle’s conception of ‘the good life’, where ‘living for others’ or even 
being occupied (or ‘preoccupied’) appears as an hindrance to living well67 Quite 
dissimilar from Aristotle, whose Greek concept of scholia, allowed for a broad range 
of activities that were non-relatable to ‘toil’ – activities engaged with the affairs of the 
polis, Seneca distinguishes between public (labour) and private life (leisure) by 
describing roles and activity relating to the communal social body as heteronomous. 
 
The individual-social dichotomy in myth 
 
To exemplify this individual-social distinction within cultural narrative, consider a 
comparison between Greek and Roman normativity through Homer’s myth of 
Odysseus-Circe juxtaposed to that of Virgil’s Aeneas-Dido: After offering moly-herb 
as immunisation to the Goddess’ transfiguration potion, Hermes advises Odysseus - 
as a sham display of masculine potency – to threaten Circe, ‘forcing’ her to swear that 
she will not ‘castrate’ him  (‘rob his man-hood’)68, where thereafter he must not 
refuse her friendship and sexual advances.69 Odysseus heeds this advice, and remains 
with Circe as her friend and lover for a year – without a conflict, or even an 
articulated distinction between the personal (intimacy with Circe, leisure on Aeaea, 
marriage to Penelope) and the political (returning to Ithaca and reassuming kingship, 
restoring his crew to human form). Entering this relationship – reconciling the 
Homeric-Olympian telos-logos with the feminine-chthonic physis - ultimately 
constitutes a clarifying inversion of Circe’s earlier submission. Circe then reveals the 
extent of her power by enabling and allowing Odysseus to proceed on his quest – and 																																																									
66 Seneca, 7,1: 2 
67 Seneca, 7,1: 3 
68 Zeruneith, 2002, 105 
69 Homer, Odyssey, 1919: 10, 301 
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this outcome was not to his prior knowledge, as Hermes did not reveal it. This is one 
way of reading an example of Odysseus not quite acting and reasoning instrumentally 
– as a sly means to an (proto-bourgeois utility-maximising) advantageous end – as 
depicted in Dialectic of Enlightenment – but rather like his epithet polytropos 
suggests, acting as a multi-dimensional being.70  
This personal-political (social) distinction approaches the status of genre in Virgil, 
who narrates in the Aeneid, that as soon as Aeneas and Dido become enamoured, both 
Gods and men begin fretting over their wanton idleness. Their indulgence within the 
personal allows them both to neglect their leadership duties: Dido halts the 
construction of Carthage, and Aeneas lingers in Africa, where the Trojan refugees 
must resign themselves to not having any purposeful direction. Mercury is 
commanded to intervene in the relationship, where he impatiently scolds and reminds 
Aeneas of his duty and destiny - to re-establish fallen Troy as Rome - for which sake 
he must instantly abandon his lover queen Dido of Carthage. Aeneas then hastens to 
abandon Dido, while excusing himself that such was,  ‘not of his own free will’.71 
Dido was first indignant and then distraught – cursing Aeneas while committing 
suicide with his sword and thereafter jumping into a funeral pyre. This image is of 
course incomplete; it does however give us an impression of the Augustan virtues of 
self-sacrifice in the name of normative institutions and roles.72  
Also consider corresponding Roman republican political ideals embodied in the figure 
of Cincinnatus, whose time spent in military-political ‘service’ was regarded as 
symbol of the noble suspension of both private life and quotidian ethics/law, as it was 
for the sake of ‘civic duty’. Cincinnatus is incidentally a heavily appropriated and 
idealised figure within U.S. political culture/history, as in for example the mimetic 
posturing of George Washington and the naming of Cincinnati73. This applies 
similarly to Republican France and figures such as Marat and Robespierre, where 
Cincinnatus and Brutus’ political assassinations and sovereign rights to declare a 
‘state of exception’74 were invoked as precedent and justification for the Terror being 																																																									
70 Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002: 28 
71 Aeneid: IV: 499 
72 Yarnall, 1994: 80-85 
73 Website: www.cincinnatusassoc.org 
74 Schmitt, 2009: 35-52 
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‘for the good of the Republic’75 As Benjamin wrote, “The French revolution viewed 
itself as Rome reincarnate. It invoked ancient Rome the way fashion invokes 
costumes of the past.”76 Also, it is almost an obligatory trope of Roman period-
narratives to include scenes of senatorial resignations ending with phrases such as, ‘I 
shall now retire from public life to my villa in Capua as a private citizen’.  
From this comparison, as with Aristotle-Seneca, it would appear that Roman thought 
employed a civil-political (individual-social) dichotomy that was absent - or at least 
less distinct - in Hellenic (and Mycenaean) Greece. It is true that Aristotle occupies 
himself with distinguishing between oikos and polis – even between that which is 
one’s own (idion) and the communal (koinon). However, the conceptual structuring of 
‘private-citizen’ in Roman thought would have (if even translatable) likely have 
seemed nonsensical to a Greek such as Aristotle: for citizenship in the polis, e.g. 
political freedom, could exist in community, as such emanated from the negation of 
the pre-eminence of the oikos and transcending the partiality of kinship ties. In 
Aristotle’s Athens, a person bound to the oikos and to menial labour was not free, and 
thus not qualitatively ‘human’. This dichotomy retains a substantial importance in our 
present as an ontology informing daily perception and political economy. To 
exemplify, consider the prioritisation of ‘families’ in US political discourse – the most 
degenerate present day incarnations of Cato and Crassus (when not demanding the 
destruction of Carthage or blundering into Parthia) unfailingly invoke the private 
citizen and the family as the basic units of society. These conceptions of society and 
politics are very different from the Greek conception as put forth by Aristotle. 
Summary 
 
This section has reviewed a selection of texts regarding the normative status of labour 
and occupation ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotle views e.g. agricultural labour and 
artisan craftsmanship as necessary productive activities: yet they are conducive to 
little if any political or philosophical virtue. Virtue and citizenship are political 
entities that are only achievable through having sufficient freedom (scholia) from 
necessity. Being bound to material necessity as well as living for the benefit of others 
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limits a person from a having any form of bios. Thus, in Aristotle’s view, the roles 
and actions of citizens were not described in the same terms as labourers or craftsman 
– rather they were conceived as free activities and associated to ‘the good life’. 
Whereas with Seneca, the category of profession or job/occupation came to 
encompass even senators and emperors – and that the life activities of persons in such 
occupations was figuratively referred to as ‘labour’ was metaphorically compared to 
domesticated animals, e.g. ‘ being in harness’. Furthermore, Seneca described many 
of the contemporary forms of leisure in terms of heteronomous obligation, where 
observation of convention and instrumental ‘networking’ annulled the conditions of a 
qualified leisure. Seneca believed that the living the professional life would likely 
result with a person remembering their life as short and unsatisfying, leaving them 
with many regrets. We also briefly consider in the context of comparative Greek-
Roman myth, the individual-social dichotomy’s role in political culture. From these 
texts, we see the Greek eleutheros and Roman patrician enjoyed a ‘freedom from 
necessity’ on significant levels, but conceived of and practiced this freedom in 
different ways. This freedom was enabled by social structures that excluded labourers 
and craftsman from political participation and through the economically indispensible 
institution of slavery. In spite of not having Daedalus’ automatons or self-weaving 
shuttles, the ancient elites made do with the social technologies they had on hand.  
I shall now explore a selection of texts from the Judeo-Christian traditions, and seek 
to derive from these some indications of the normative value of labour in these 
religious and theological contexts. 
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Concepts of Labour in Judeo-Christian Traditions 
 
In the Judeo-Christian creation myth, the world is created in six days, where the 
seventh day is one of rest. This myth establishes the practice of observing the 
Sabbath. In Exodus, observing this ‘day of rest’ is inscribed as a divine 
commandment, “Six days shalt thou do thy work, and on the seventh day thou shalt 
rest”77 A common interpretation of this, within both the Jewish rabbinic tradition78 
and Catholic theology79, is that it commands, in equally positive terms, both 
observations of the Sabbath and of the working week.80 Here we see the working 
week conceived as an emulation of the Judeo-Christian God’s creative work (opus 
Dei) and divine rest. Importantly, the commandment indicates in what proportion 
exertion and rest should be rationed: six to one, respectively.  
 
The myth of the ‘fall of Man’ entails one of the most central moral conceptions of 
labour; that toilsome labour is a punishment for having sinned in Paradise. However, 
despite the Garden of Eden being commonly interpreted as ‘paradise’ - as a care-free 
and abundant place prior to effort and toil - the active role of Man is, in multiple sites 
linked to necessary conditions of Eden’s (and Earth’s) fertility:  
 
“No shrub of the field was yet in the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprung up; 
for the LORD God had not caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was not a man 
to till the ground;”81  
 
Also: “And the LORD God took the man, and put him into the Garden of Eden to 
dress it and to keep it.”82 Thus, Edenic Man appears in these texts as a pleasantly 
occupied gardener – one who’s ‘tilling’, ‘dressing’ and ‘keeping’ appear in the text as 
being required for the maintenance of plant and animal life – making Man an active 
custodian. Thomas Aquinas also debates certain interpretations on this passage, where 
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he asks, “Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?”83 Considering 
an objection, that “(…) the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin. Therefore a 
man was not placed in paradise to dress it and keep it.”84 Aquinas proposes two 
preferable interpretations, in which he aligns himself with Augustine: that the 
‘dressing and keeping’ may be firstly understood as God working ‘in’ Man, thus 
‘keeping him from evil’; secondly, and seemingly to Aquinas’ preference: 
 
“(…) that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have 
involved labour, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's 
practical knowledge of the powers of nature.”85  
This notion takes on complexity slightly further in Genesis, where the concept of 
work as ‘toil’ appears clearly to be constituted as punishment. As vengeance for 
having eaten from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Adam and Eve were 
expelled from Eden and condemned to eat in sorrow for the rest of their days:  
“Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the 
field; In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground;”86  
It seems fair to conclude, as Aquinas does, that Edenic Man was not punished with 
the imperative to produce as such, but rather with the degree of difficulty entailed in 
the labour required to sustain life. Apropos the punishments of difficult and painful 
labour, let us not forget a similar passage regarding another category of labour, which 
we may call using Michael Hardt’s terms, affective/reproductive labour87 - similarly 
conceived as an unavoidable and painful ‘sorrow’.88  
It seems to be, that the punishment of labour – in Adam’s case the difficulty of 
wresting ‘bread’ from a harsh earth of thorns and thistles, and for Eve the burden and 
pain of reproduction and care-giving – may be reduced to a punishment of general 
difficulty and suffering; the difficulty of sustaining and reproducing life. Thus, this 
passage may be understood as providing a foundational normative concept that 																																																									
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equates human life as being necessarily toilsome and painful – that on account of 
‘original sin’, suffering must be accepted as justified and deserved. Martin Luther 
exemplifies this moral, stressing in his interpretation of divine will, that Christians 
should live in fearful precarity, without having any control or a sense of safety 
concerning the material conditions of life, where the pious should only ever pray for 
their ‘daily bread’:  
“… alt er i Guds hånd alene – og han vil ikke have, at vi får en tøddel magt eller ret 
over for fremtiden, og at vi noget øjeblik skal være sikre og trygge over for den.”89  
In relation to this, it is worth noting that in Genesis, after Adam and Eve were 
expelled from Eden, a flaming sword was placed at its entrance. That Man was 
prohibited re-entry into paradise may be understood as a allegoric warning; that 
paradise, or an earthly life free from woe, is an impossibility - that such is God’s will. 
Therefore, any desire to re-attain the blissful and leisurely life of paradise in this 
world appears as hubris or heresy. 
The notion of a life of labour as ‘toil’ and ‘sorrow’ is however not always consistent 
within the Judeo-Christian traditions. Contentment, satisfaction, and happiness, not 
simply material sustenance, are on various occasions invoked as a central concern: 
“For thou shalt eat the labour of thine hands: happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well 
with thee.”90 The labour that produces the basic material needs of common people is 
presented as demanding, yet honest and inherently rewarding – and where simple 
needs could be adequately satisfied through such labour if not for the avarice of the 
rich:  
“The sleep of a labouring man [is] sweet, whether he eat little or much: but the 
abundance of the rich will not suffer him to sleep. There is a sore evil which I have 
seen under the sun, namely, riches kept for the owners thereof to their hurt.”91 
The portrayal here of what would be a well-contented farmer – if not for the greed of 
the rich - is quite different from that of Adam ‘eating in the sweat of his face’, as seen 
in the harsher passages of Genesis. Here, the farmer is shown as enjoying the well-																																																									
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deserved rewards of honest effort and resting well in satisfaction – where his torment 
come not from his labour as divine punishment, but rather from a pitiless human agent 
who instrumentalises labourers to support luxury and pride.92 
 Aquinas also discusses satisfaction in labour, in his considerations on the merits of 
the active (vita activa) and the contemplative life (vita contemplativa) within clerical 
orders. Although favouring vita contemplativa for its relation to piety and wisdom, 
Aquinas considers the vita activa to have the central inherent virtue of maintaining 
life, as well as a certain therapeutic value in ‘calming the passions’ e.g., treating what 
we may call depression, or the ‘sadness of the soul’, which was associated to the 
capital vice of sloth (acedia):  
“ (…) active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal passions of 
the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, 
since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions.”93  
In a further passage from the same discussion, Aquinas mentions what we may think 
of as differing character psychologies, which predispose persons to the different 
forms of labour: 
“Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "there be some so restless that when they 
are free from labour they labour all the more, because the more leisure they have for 
thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear."94  
Just as such Aquinas understood both vita activa and vita contemplativa as having 
inherent spiritual virtue and practical value, ‘idleness’ – associated to acedia – a 
spiritual inertia or suspension of purpose – was considered to be an especially potent 
vice - as a potential root in all vices, and by extension, evil: 
“ (…) the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act 
of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine 
good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.”95 
																																																									
92 Ecclesiastes: 5:12 
93 Aquinas, 1947-1948: 2592 
94 Aquinas, 1947-1948: 2594 
95 Aquinas, 1947-1948: 1795 
		 33	
Aside from Aquinas’ distinctions, we also see a much earlier differentiation between 
forms of labour in texts such as the Wisdom of Sirach – Ben Sira in Hebrew -, which 
is a rabbinic text written in Hellenistic Egypt in the 2nd century BCE96, and deals with 
questions of ‘practical wisdom’. The Wisdom of Sirach is included as respected 
apocrypha within Judaism and all protestant denominations, and is canon within 
Catholicism. Here, difficult and laborious professions are contrasted to those of more 
leisurely and literary format, which perhaps indicates some influence from Greek 
thinking in Ptolemaic Egypt, where the text was authored: “The wisdom of a scribe 
cometh by his time of leisure: and he that is less in action, shall receive wisdom.”97  
 
Sirach describes a hierarchy of professions, where physically strenuous trades are 
portrayed as torments and that ‘waste the flesh’98, which are at the same time are 
obstructions to the development of wisdom.99 Whereas Sirach recognises the labourer 
and artisan as necessary – “Without these a city is not built.”100 – he also remarks on 
the labourer’s exclusion from both the benefits of the city and participation within 
power structures:  
 
“And they shall not dwell, nor walk about therein, and they shall not go up into the 
assembly. Upon the judges' seat they shall not sit, and the ordinance of judgment they 
shall not understand, neither shall they declare discipline and judgment, and they 
shall not be found where parables are spoken:”101  
 
The labour concept that Sirach expresses shows a preference for literary trades – 
scribes and rabbis, who enjoy cleaner and relaxed professions that do not ‘waste the 
flesh’. Yet, such reasons are only a mentioned as a kind of fringe benefit: the primary 
good of ‘studying the law’ (the Torah), or in Aquinas’ terms, vita contemplativa, is 
that of ‘doing God’s work’. This notion associates scholars and scribes to both ‘truth’ 
and ‘the Divine’, making their labour especially valuable and esteemed. This 
portrayal has many commonalities with both normative and descriptive labour 																																																									
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articulations from Aristotle’s Politics; it is indeed likely that the educated Ben Sira 
has some knowledge of Aristotle. We do however know for certain that Aquinas 
consistently referenced ‘the Philosopher’ in Summa Theologica, where Aquinas also 
expresses a Latinised/Christianised, yet still rather Aristotelian view on the 
relatedness of leisure-enabled pious scholarship and wisdom/truth:  
 
“Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for 
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the Divine "truth seeks a holy 
leisure," namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the 
contemplative life seeks (…)”102  
 
It seems clear that Aristotle’s philosophical concepts, such as scholia enabling the 
bios theoretikos, were incorporated into scholastic philosophy and the late-medieval 
normative concept of labour103. Again, labour appears as a necessary productive 
activity – yet it also appears that certain moral allegories from the Judean Old-
Testament were interpreted through a Latinised Greek political philosophy and 
metaphysics – these interpretations served to frame the vita contemplativa as a ‘holy 
leisure’, as contrasted to ‘idleness’.104 At this point, commercial professions have still 
largely been neglected. The following will examine Luther’s normative 
conceptualisations of what we may call, ‘the acquisitive life’. 
 
Luther & trade  
 
Social esteem for merchants and financiers has a complicated history. Plato for 
example was positively hostile to trade and travel, as for him they embody the 
corruptive dangers of foreign cultural influence and undermine of the ideal of self-
sufficiency.105 Furthermore, as Karl Popper suggests, Plato viewed trade and travel as 
embodiments of flux, which pose clear problems for philosopher kings trying to 
maintain order and discipline through the static ontological hierarchies of ideal-
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forms.106 Aristotle was not quite as adverse to trade as Plato was, yet did rank 
merchants in line with the other banausos. Christian doctrine was, prior to the early 
renaissance largely ambivalent towards commerce.107 It was directly hostile to 
finance.108 That this is the case may be interpreted as largely due to a two-fold moral 
concept pervading much of the Judeo-Christian traditions. Let us name this ‘the 
blessedness of poverty’ – a moral concept with an inextricable converse, which we 
shall call ‘the wickedness of wealth’ - the latter having associations to avarice 
(avaritia), gluttony (gula), and pride (superbia). These appear in countless passages of 
biblical texts, exemplified in e.g. “blessed are the poor (…)”109 “It is easier for a 
camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom 
of God”110, and the ‘cleansing of the temple’ scene in Matthew 21:12-21:16. Yet 
despite this, churches have always been wealthy, and have been reliable allies to the 
rich and powerful - only in the most seldom of circumstances have Christian clergy 
sincerely supported the material interests of the poor against the interests of the 
powerful beyond mere symbolic gestures. This is a compounded theme, and one, 
which I will not be able to treat in any depth. I shall however explore the theme via 
Luther, as he voices a range of normative concepts on trade as a profession, and its 
moral relation to labour and vocation. 
Luther views trade and a range of related occupations such as ‘merchandizing’, 
‘money-lending’, ‘insurance-selling’ et al., as essentially sinful – and that they are 
conducive to various forms of ‘knavish trickery’. As a consequence of dealing with 
intangible and contingent values, Luther held that ‘trade and usury’ may undermine 
the functions of the real productive economy.111 Citing Sirach, Luther states that that 
‘businessmen cannot feasibly live without sin’.112 This is in Luther’s view predicated 
on what he identifies as a law, or principle, that may be paraphrased as; ‘I am entitled 
to sell my wares for whatever price they may fetch’.113 Luther’s associates the 
application of this principle with merchants exploiting the urgency and importance of 																																																									
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their customers needs.114 In later economic terms, this principle can be related to the 
subjective theory of value, which opposes the labour theory of value115. In Luther’s 
view, a merchant may only morally claim compensation for the expenses, risk, effort 
and time required to bring a product to market. Such a claim is legitimate only insofar 
as the merchant is adequately sustained, as a type of labourer. It is of utmost relevance 
that Luther provides us with a concise formula for determining a morally justifiable 
compensation for merchants, where he uses the wages of common labourers as a 
benchmark for reasonable merit:  
“Men hvor højt du skal sætte den indtægt, som du bør tjene ved denne handel og ved 
dit arbejde, kan du ikke beregne og anslå bedre end ved at lave et overslag over 
arbejdets varighed og omfang og så drage en sammenligning med en almindelig 
arbejder, der har et andet arbejde, og se, hvad han tjener om dagen. Regn derefter ud, 
hvor mange dage du har anvendt til at hente og fremskaffe varen, og omfanget af det 
arbejde og den risiko, du har haft.”116  
This is in line with Aquinas’ argument concerning legitimate trade – that only value 
should be traded for value.117 Luther thus reproduces a doctrinal method of 
conversion that can morally equate acquisition with labour. This formula may be seen 
as a foreshadowing of the later (modern) tendency to signify the qualities of all 
vocations in normative terms of labour – where lawyers, dentists, chauffeurs and 
garbage collectors denote their role as ‘having a job’. The English term is inadequate 
in expressing this relation to labour, however the German Arbeit is most appropriate. I 
shall return to this point. 
Whereas Luther makes many claims concerning moral and pious options for Christian 
merchants, he ultimately relinquishes the force and applicability of his critique by 
stating that such a moral system of trade and finance would only be feasible in a ‘truly 																																																									
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Christian’ society. Luther makes his view of ‘human nature’ clear in the following: 
“For den menneskelig natur er bedragerisk, svigefuld, løgnagtig og upålidelig, sådan 
som Biblen siger det …”.118 Furthermore, Luther argues, that because ‘there are so 
few real Christians’, Christian law and Evangelical morality would, if allowed to 
dictate the practical conditions of business and similar ‘worldly affairs’, ruin business 
and leave communities without adequate resources: 
“Alt dette vil ske, hvis man ville regere verden efter evangeliet og ikke ville presse og 
tvinge de onde ved hjælp af love og magtanvendelse til at gør og underkaste sig, hvad 
der er ret.”119  
Thus in Luther’s view, ‘worldly affairs’ are best governed through the coercive power 
of the worldly government (Das weltliche Regiment), which can with its ‘strong 
hand’, force ‘evil persons’ into submission (IBID.) This view appears to be 
remarkably similar to the Latin proverb, homo homini lupus est, perhaps most famous 
from Thomas Hobbes’ usage in Leviathan. Thus both Luther and Hobbes assume as a 
premise that ‘human nature’ is essentially predatory, parasitic and asocial, which 
necessitates and justifies disciplinary power and its use of coercion.  Luther then 
relates this view of ‘human nature’ back the Christian doctrine, explaining that the 
sinning afforded by one’s vocation, e.g. trade and rule, may be individually managed 
with prayer. Furthermore, Luther makes an interesting comparison: that just as he 
understood sex (or ‘marital duty’, as he calls it) to be a sin - albeit necessary for 
reproduction and thus forgivable - a reasonable and expected amount of sin done in 
the service of necessary commerce is thus also subject to forgiveness via prayer.120 It 
would seem that Luther makes an implicit appeal for Christian morality to not disturb 
the incentive structures of commerce, as trade was an important contributor to 
society’s material needs - and furthermore, that the management of sin and poor 
conscience acquired via commercial occupations should be relegated to the individual 
– through individual prayer and atonement, which in Lutheran doctrine is possible as 
all Christians become empowered with what was formerly the monopoly of ordained 
priests within the Catholic version of the ‘spiritual government’. In Lutheran doctrine 
of the ‘spiritual government’ (Das geistliche Regiment) shifts from being embodied as 																																																									
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the Catholic Church, and becomes a delineated interface between Protestant 
communities and the divine.121 Das weltliche Regiment, on the other hand remained 
clearly definable and enjoyed Luther’s loyal support.122 
Returning to the notion of ‘the blessedness of poverty’, Luther makes peculiar 
inverted use of this concept. After unfolding one of his four proposals for a Christian 
commerce, one concerning a generous and non-conditional gift economy, Luther 
again refers to human ‘untrustworthiness’. He explains that whereas such a system 
would be in accordance with the ideals of Christian morality, it is practically 
unfeasible due to the ‘natural’ base inclinations of people – especially those of the 
poor. To paraphrase Luther; in a Christian economy, loans would be lent without 
expectation of repayment, where if the needy lender should not be able to repay a 
loan, this loan should be converted into a gift. However, because people are ‘not 
really Christians’ – they are in fact shameless and lazy - they can only be expected to 
default on debts, indulge themselves on the products of other’s labour, and thus 
undermine the material needs of society:  
“For kristne er brødre, og de svigter ikke hinanden, og der er heller ikke nogen af 
dem, der er så doven og skamløs, at han uden arbejde fortrøster sig til andres midler 
og arbejde og vil leve af det uden at bestille noget.”123  
Luther’s reasoning is peculiar in that while the explicit object of his critique is ‘trade 
and usury’, he appears equally, if not more, hostile towards disenfranchised groups – 
i.e. the ‘wretched of the earth’124– than towards land owners, tradesmen and 
aristocrats. Instead of employing Christian ethics for advocating ‘redeeming the poor 
and needy from deceit and violence’125, he argues for the necessity of the ‘worldly 
sword’ (weltliche Schwertgewalt), upholding law and order against heretical demands 
of for example the Swabian sans-culottes.126 In referencing this ‘worldly sword’, 
Luther is employing the doctrine of the divine right of kings, which is derived and 
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justified from by Paul in Romans 13:1-4.127  
Luther’s labour concept - as it appears in these texts - is largely as follows: that the 
worldly social order is of divine will, and should not be challenged, especially not 
with reference to Christian doctrine. Every type of labourer should simply labour, as 
befits their vocation, or ‘calling’ (from the Latin vocatio – to German, Beruf), as all 
professions and trades are of equal spiritual value in an idealist-religious sense – as all 
‘worldly’ roles are ultimately judged as equal members of Das geistliche Regiment. 
As to their real differentiation in status and type within this world – as subordinates of 
Das weltliche Regiment – such is of little moral concern, as this world is merely 
fleeting, imperfect and crude – and that secular-political social mobility impulses may 
be likened to disturbing a good order and to inciting heretical revolt.128 
 
For Luther, ‘emancipation’, or the abandonment of the Catholic hierarchies of 
regimes (clergy over laity), should only be understood in a spiritual sense – equality 
in spiritual value and not secular-political status (or rather ‘placement/position’ – 
Stellungen) - that redemption is only found through individualised spirituality, and is 
first fully realised in the afterlife. Thus, Luther’s reform was that of ordaining all to a 
spiritual priesthood status, which he likely imagined would be a great consolation for 
whatever worldly misfortunes might have existed. All were equalised in regards to 
spiritual authority, yet commanded to petrify in their proper worldly vocation, serving 
in whatever role they were ‘called upon’ to perform. For Luther, living conditions for 
peasants and labourers should be better, but such is ultimately a matter of individual 
conscience (pertaining sin) for the nobility and the burghers. The desire for worldly 
improvements and comforts were seen as vanities, as this world is temporary (or 
‘temporal’) - meaning both that one’s life in it is limited, and that ‘revolution is 
always forbidden and that Earth is expected to at any moment end in Apocalypse’129. 
Thus, Luther seems to place higher value on biblical references supporting ‘law and 
order’ and ‘property rights’ than on biblical support for what may be called ‘Christian 
egalitarian socialism’, as cited in Psalms 13, Matthew 19:24.  																																																									
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Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the historically normative status of labour, scholarship, 
clerical roles, and trade. From Old Testament accounts, labour-as-difficulty appears as 
a divine punishment for original sin. Labour was described as the necessary and 
honest activity that supports life. We have also seen that all activities of purpose share 
the common status as emulations of the opus Dei ‘work week’. We see in both The 
Wisdom of Sirach and Summa Theologica the normative value of physical labour 
contrasted to that of scholarship and priesthood. This is expressed concisely in the 
concepts of vita activa and vita contemplativa. Here labour is rearticulated as a 
necessary means to life, and also presented as way of avoiding sin and vice, e.g. 
acedia. The vita contemplativa held higher political and religious status, as medieval 
Christian ontologies privileged endeavours related to abstractions such as ‘the Divine’ 
and ‘truth’. Luther criticises commercial occupations and reproduces an earlier 
Catholic doctrinal formula for converting the merit of trade income into the currency 
of common labour - this serves as a point of reference for legitimate earning. 
However, Luther rejects the practical applicability of a Christian trade ethos, and 
defers to worldly authority and an individualised Christian ethics. Luther relates the 
egalitarian character of Christianity, only to dismiss its practical applicability as law 
on account of a base ‘human nature’. Luther revolts against the professional Catholic 
clergy, which may be seen as initiating protestant disregard for the institutional vita 
contemplativa. Luther’s reform also enshrined the legitimacy of secular government 
and supported its oppression of disenfranchised groups whom were framed as 
‘bandits’ and ‘thieves’.130 Thus throughout this period the aristocratic and clerical 
elites maintained their ‘freedom from necessity’ by preserving the social structures 
and norms. 
The following chapter moves into classical- through to late modernity. Here we 
review and analyse the normative labour concept as developed Karl Marx and Hannah 
Arendt. 
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Labour in Modernity 
 
Labour and alienation in classical modernity 
 
This chapter deals with normative labour and related concerns in classical to late-
modernity.  These normative concepts are sought after in the philosophical and 
political-economy/sociological texts of Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt. These have 
the commonality of exploring the confrontation between technological-industrial 
paradigm shifts and the normative conception of labour. These texts are selected 
because they appreciate the transitioning social status and nature of labour in two 
periods of notable change. It seems most appropriate to begin chronologically with 
the first of the young Karl Marx’s Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts (1844).I 
will also consider some of the older Marx’s thoughts on labour and machines from the 
Grundrisse. An effort is made to do justice to the totality of the Marx’s argument and 
wider scholarship, while maintaining a focus on those of his concepts that are most 
central to this investigation - these being: ‘what is labour?’, ‘what is Capital?’, ‘What 
is alienation and how does it apply to automation?’ Arendt’s conceptual 
differentiating between labour, work, and action will follow the section on Marx, 
serving as both an independent articulation of a normative labour concept as well as a 
relational critic pertaining Marx and Aristotle. 
 
On Marx’s Methodology 
 
In the introduction to the 1844 manuscripts, Marx describes his critique as a positive 
critique – as an analysis “ (…) based on wholly empirical means … based on a 
conscientious critical study of political economy … proceed[ing] from an actual 
economic fact.”131 In this introduction Marx makes his position regarding 
philosophical/German idealism clear, most significantly in relation to Hegel and the 
young Hegelians/Bruno Bauer - the ‘quite critical critics’ of the ‘massy mass’.132 In 
such articulations, Marx insinuates the (progressive) epistemological superiority of an 																																																									
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empirical/naturalist methodology. However, it may be said that Marx is 
superimposing this ‘positive’ approach onto Hegel’s imminent historical method – 
which is essentially idealist and teleological.133 Furthermore, it is worth saying, that 
the young Marx seemingly maintained throughout the 1844 manuscripts an interest in 
redeeming aspects of Hegelian philosophy – this interest is most notable in dialectic 
historicism and the concept of alienation (Entfremdung)134 – the incommensurable 
relationship between subject and object that Hegel developed from Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetics in Kritik der Reinen Fornunft (1781). However, qua Marx’s 
declared naturalism, alienation was to be demonstrated ostensibly as an actual 
phenomenon – as the malady of the ‘truly’ universal class - the proletariat. In the 
later Marx, a distilled version of this methodology became more neatly and rigorously 
theorised as Marx/Engels’ historical method135, which only in later orthodox Marxist 
theory came to be known as historical materialism.136 
Marx utilises, as his point of departure, a range of concepts, definitions and economic 
data from a variety of scholarships within political economy. For establishing a 
general disciplinary consensus, Marx appropriately draws primarily on the writings of 
Adam Smith, from The Wealth of Nations (1776). For the purpose of reporting 
contemporary empirical data, Marx cites a selection of authors, most consistently the 
findings of Wilhelm Schulz in Die Bewegung der Produktion (1843). It seems prudent 
to mention that all of the cited political economists used in the 1844 manuscripts 
wrote with detectable ideological agendas. Marx referenced Smith’s theories as 
useful, both as empirical descriptions of economic generalities and also as 
authoritative representations of the economic discipline. Marx problematizes aspects 
of Smith’s thinking, thereupon deriving his own definitions, which form in part the 
premises for his argumentation. In the following, when a definition is ascribed to 
Marx, it will often be the case that such definitions (and ‘actual empirical facts’) 
originate from those of Smith or other political economists. Therefore, while Marx’s 
had a stated naturalist inclination, I argue that the 1844 manuscripts are largely an 
philosophical and ideological-normative work, and primarily the product of critical 																																																									
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analysis. 
Labour & Alienation 	
 
Marx writes, that Labour is defined within political economy as an “activity as a 
source of livelihood.”137 Solely by means of labour is it possible to improve upon the 
‘products of nature’. This ‘improving’ upon nature, by alterations/augmentations of 
land or the products of nature (e.g. manufactured goods) provides, according to 
political economists and philosophers138, the legal and moral justification for 
ownership or property. This justification follows from the idea of labour being ‘man’s 
active possession’, and is thus the only intrinsic and non-derivative form of 
ownership. Following this reason, if one invests labour into an ‘unimproved’ and 
unclaimed ‘product of nature’, the object becomes infused with the subject’s active 
possession (labour), thus making the qualities, or properties, of the object an 
extension of the subject.139  
 Property rights allow for accumulations of goods, or value, so that such 
accumulations allow for owners to dispense of, trade, invest, extract, etc. When such 
accumulations of goods – as accumulated labour – are employed in ways that generate 
surplus, such goods, stock or value may be called Capital: “Funds, or stock, is any 
accumulation of products of the soil or of manufacture. Stock is called capital only 
when it yields to its owner a revenue or profit.”140 Capital is thus defined by Marx as 
a privately owned and aggregated value at work – in its ‘essence’, Capital is 
accumulated labour, which is employed so as to generate income by way of wealth 
creation or extraction. In this sense, land, buildings, stock, and naturally money, may 
all be classified as forms of Capital. From these forms, revenue is collected through 
rent, profit from sales/exchanges, and interest, respectively.141  
Marx then generalises this definition of Capital, albeit retaining the aforesaid concept 
of accumulated labour: “Capital is thus the governing power over labour and its 
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products.”142 Marx subdivides this definition of Capital into two types: fixed and 
circulating. Fixed capital is described as: “Fixed capital consists of capital invested 
“in the improvement of land, in the purchase of useful machines and instruments of 
trade, or in such-like things.”143 Thus the purpose of fixed Capital is to potentiate the 
productive, or revenue generating, potential of a given resource. Circulating Capital is 
understood as ventured Capital:  
“‘His capital is continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in 
another, and it is only by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges’ and 
transformations ‘that it can yield him any profit.’ ”144  
Marx observes that when Capital contracts the use of labour, and via the institution of 
wages pays them the lowest possible amount – far lower than the value created by 
labour - Capital is also collecting revenue from labour. The owner’s revenue on 
labour is thus the difference between the value created by labour, and the wages paid. 
Marx described the purchasing power of wages as being, even in the best of economic 
conditions – growth - as merely sufficient to maintain the existence of the worker in 
the role of worker. Such wages thus disregard other aspects of worker’s existence - 
such matters are relegated to priests and doctors.145   
Following Marx’s considerations on wages, he explores the institution of rent. In line 
with the justification of private property, those of Locke and the subsequent 
expansions made by political economists such as Smith, the ownership of land has to 
do with an infusion of the owner’s subject with the object that is the land. In this 
sense, the land itself, and the productive qualities of the land (e.g. fertility, geographic 
situation – meaning for example seaside placement and the capacity for access to 
kelp, fish etc.) become associated – as an attribute or virtue - to the owner.146 
Following this reasoning, a tenant would necessarily have to pay a portion of the 
land’s products to the owner, who as the title-holder of a passive asset, is regarded by 
the premises of Smith’s political economy as being passively productive. This is to 
say, that by right of first appropriation (Locke), the owner is considered to be a co-																																																									
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generator of all future production, even insofar as they remain entirely passive in 
terms of labour. This is not to say that Smith and similar minded political 
economists147 wholly condoned the institution of rent. David Ricardo and Thomas 
Malthus debated over whether investment trends favouring rent-generating assets 
might obstruct national wealth creation. Marx cites Smith’s criticism of the 
monopolistic, extractive, and dare we say exploitive, quality of rent: 
“The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is 
naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have 
laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; but to 
what the farmer can afford to give.”148  
Here Marx appreciates rent as being similar to wages, in that the owner demands in 
payment for land usage, as much as is possible, while still allowing the tenant to 
maintain their existence as a productive labourer. Marx thus characterises this 
relationship between the tenant and landlord as being a ‘hostile antagonism of 
interests’.149  
In summary, Marx’s argumentation appears as follows: 1) that labour, for itself, is 
defined as ‘activity as a means to life’, 2) that Capital is accumulated labour, which 
‘by right of positive law’ awards the first appropriator with legal and moral 
ownership of Capital – this Capital is then conceived as being an kind of endogenous 
productive force – as an object impregnated with the productive subjectivity of the 
owner. 3) that rent and wages antagonise labourers and tenants by limiting their 
merited shares to merely enable ‘barely supporting subsistence’ – that is, merely 
maintaining their functional existence as labourers, without regard to the remaining 
aspects of their existence as social-political human beings – in Kant’s terms, ‘merely 
as a means’.150  Marx’s criticism of these matters cumulates in the problematisation of 
labour as a commodity – the problem of alienation: 
“The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his 
production increases in power and size. The worker becomes an ever cheaper 																																																									
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commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is 
in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.”151  
Marx relates the preceding argumentation to four distinct manifestations of alienation, 
which cumulate into a fifth form. The first of these pertains the estrangement to things 
- meaning the relationship between labourers and the products of their labour. This 
estrangement arises as a result of a number of factors: one being the division of labour 
- the fragmentation of skilled, and largely autonomous artisanal production into de-
skilled/de-constructed ‘assembly line’ procedures .152 To exemplify, a craftsman-
cobbler may recognise and identify themselves with their shoes, both in manufacture 
and following sale. An un-skilled factory labourer engaged in for example repetitious 
sole-stitching would neither recognise, nor identify with, nor take pride in a finished 
shoe – the shoe as object would not be infused with the subjectivity of its producer(s), 
but rather only with the brand of the capitalist. The second aspect of ‘estrangement to 
things’ has to do with the product of labour, as “… an alien object exercising power 
over him.”153  
Marx describes the second form of alienation, self-estrangement, as resulting from the 
“… relationship of labour to the act of production within the labour process.”154 This 
directly entails the transformation of labour from a direct and somewhat autonomous 
‘activity as a means to life’, into an entirely heteronomous ‘labour as a means to life 
as labourer’. This is to say that self-estrangement takes place when a person’s 
activity, and thereby life, is not properly their own. Rather it is an existence as an 
‘instrument wielding instruments’ – as an automaton of Daedalus - commanded by 
the will of another and animated by a sustenance wage.155  
Marx’s third form of alienation entails a labourer’s estrangement from existence as a 
species-being (Gattungswesen). This point cannot be properly appreciated without 
considering the ideas of Feuerbach,156 wherefrom Marx borrowed, at least in part, the 																																																									
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concept. This form of alienation is ultimately predicated on the historic emergence of 
individualisation. Labourers in servitude to Capital are afforded little possibility of 
conceiving and realising themselves as active members of any social body or polity. 
This is, in Marx’s argument, related to the mental and material poverty resulting from 
the lowest possible wages, the highest possible rent and the functioning as labourer 
for the greatest possible proportion of time.157  
Relating back to Aristotle, one could say that Marx’s idea here entails that as 
labourers lack the necessary scholia, they have little chance to develop the ‘higher’ 
human faculties that enable e.g. political participation (to exercise power) and 
inclusion in theatres of knowledge – as politikon zoon and bios theoretikos. Crucially, 
this individualisation hinders workers from collectivising their experiences in social 
regimes: 
“In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labour 
tears from him his species-life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and 
transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, 
nature, is taken from him.”158  
Marx’s fourth form of alienation may be understood as an extension of the third form, 
namely estrangement of man from man.159 If we accept the notion of estrangement to 
human sociality, then such atomised beings - who conceive their subjectivity and 
positions within social hierarchies to be the justified consequences of their individual 
value and effort - would feel to be and in all actuality would be rather isolated. This 
form of estrangement is a matter of perception that, Marx argues, results from 
experiences of alienation to production and the material products of labour as a means 
to life. The third and fourth forms of estrangement are social effects that are 
predicated on the practical acts of alienated labour, as seen in the first and second 
forms. Thus, the final and cumulative consequence of alienated labour is the 																																																																																																																																																															
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estrangement of ‘man-to-self.’160 For Marx, alienated labour must be understood as 
labour done for the benefit of someone – the alien – who is none other than ‘the other 
man’: this relationship is one of de-humanisation, one could say a social pathology, 
and applies to both labourers and masters of labour.161  
Thus What Marx called alienated labour could be characterised as a source of a 
multifaceted dehumanising social pathology – a pathology that (re)structures 
intersubjective social relations into relations between others – and that this is 
accomplished by privatisation for example through impregnating objects with 
metaphysical associations to subjects as justification for appropriation. In extension of 
this, Marx then arrives at a formula, that private property is derived from the concept 
of alienated labour, and that private property is thereby ‘identical’ with wages.162  
 
Alienation and automation 
 
Let us now consider Marx’s perspectives on machines and automation. We have 
established that machines are in Capitalist economies classifiable as fixed Capital, 
that is accumulated-objectified labour that is productive without being ventured into 
market circulation. The older Marx wrote that machinery is the Capitalist’s preferred 
form of fixed capital and that fixed Capital, “… so far as capital's relations with itself 
are concerned, appears as the most adequate form of capital as such.”163 Therefore, if 
labour-saving productive machines were owned as private property, it would in 
Marx’s view follow that both products and any related labour would be tainted by 
alienation – and furthermore, that all social relations predicated on this ‘mode of 
production’ would be rendered as relations between others. If then, labour-saving 
machines were not owned as private property - but rather as truly human property, or 
social property164 - yet still abstracted humans from both production processes and 
products by making human labour redundant, would a Marxian theory of alienation 
still to some degree apply? Unfortunately, the first 1844 manuscript ends abruptly and 																																																									
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does not complete the investigation and provide a clear answer to this question. 
However, the older Marx did leave us with certain indications: 
“In machinery, objectified labour materially confronts living labour as a ruling power 
and as an active subsumption of the latter under itself, not only by appropriating it, 
but in the real production process itself.”165  
One could support this view further by arguing that Marx does seem to imagine that, 
for example collectively growing food or crafting goods in the absence of private 
property relations would be inherently rewarding and human – as an unmediated way 
of being and perceiving the ‘sensuous external world’ and labour’s products with 
lucidity - being ‘truly’ self-conscious166 as a labouring social class.167 If such labour 
could be fully automated, would people not loose something valuable, namely their 
labour and identities as labourers. Would they not be alienated through the 
confrontation with an alien machine power?  Perhaps, but it is also arguable that as 
young Marx’s basic concept of non-alienated labour is critical of the division of 
labour, that this would apply similarly to employment as a social norm.168 In some 
senses, Marx’s non-alienated labour concept seems parochial169, and at times even 
nostalgic in regard to a technologically unsophisticated mode of production like 
artisanal production. However, we bear in mind the totality of Marx’s scholarship and 
historical materialism as a teleology: In this teleology, the Capitalist mode of 
production – including the objectification of labour as machines – is a necessary 
consequence of alienated labour and private property. Crucially, the Capitalist-
bourgeoisie stage of historical-material development is seen as a pre-condition for 
Socialism. In other words, the productivity of machines does have a non-alienating 
and emancipatory potential. We may perhaps resolve this by briefly looking again 																																																									
165 Marx, 1973: 622 
166 As opposed to the concept of False Consciousness – not Marx’s concept - see Engels’ 
correspondence with Franz Mehring (1898). Also Lucács’ essay Class Consciousness (1920). 
167 Marx, 1959: 29 
168Marx, 1959: 34 
169 This parochialism is immediately apparent in The German Ideology, in the passage where Marx 
writes about professions becoming (pastoral) hobbies such as fishing, hunting, raising cattle and 
critiquing, all without become fisherman, hunters, etc. Arendt criticises Marx for imagining an 
emancipated state of Socialism, where people spend their freedom in private and ‘world-less’ pursuits, 
rather than rediscovering the bios politikos though ‘living among men’ in speech and action. Through 
the prioritisation of such ‘world-less’ and material ‘hobbies’, the concerns of the oikos transpose 
themselves as the economic concerns of the polis, thereby displacing the true and free political life. 
(Arendt, 1998: 117. cit. Marx, Deutsche Ideologie pp. 22 & 373) (Website: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/) 
		 50	
towards the Fragment on Machines from the Grundrisse, where labour-saving 
machines and automation are indeed named as part of the very condition of human 
emancipation. To cite Marx at length:  
“… this in no way means that this use value - machinery as such - is capital, or that 
its existence as machinery is identical with its existence as capital; any more than 
gold would cease to have use value as gold if it were no longer money.”170 … 
Through this process, the amount of labour necessary for the production of a given 
object is indeed reduced to a minimum, but only in order to realise a maximum of 
labour in the maximum number of such objects. The first aspect is important, because 
capital here - quite unintentionally - reduces human labour, expenditure of energy, to 
a minimum. This will redound to the benefit of emancipated labour, and is the 
condition of its emancipation.”171 
In the event of such emancipation - where machines reduce effort and toil to a 
minimum and mass-produce material abundance as social wealth – it is appropriate to 
revaluate concepts of labour and the modern normative centrality of productivity. For, 
when Marx conceives of ‘emancipated labour’, has not the very instance of techno-
social emancipation eliminated much ‘labour’ from productivity? If we accept that 
late-modern productive economies are inextricably linked to labour-saving 
technology, perhaps it would be better to substitute labour as a central concept with 
another term that does not have connotations of mulish toil and pain, and therefore not 
necessarily imply compensation and incentive mechanisms. It is fortunate that 
Hannah Arendt has already done much of this for us. 
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Labour, work, and action 
 
As we have seen in Marx, labour gains a special normative status in classical 
modernity and ‘productivity’ reigns supreme. Arendt notes that Marx’s gesture of 
theoretically turning the former social-occupational hierarchy ‘on its head’, 
unfortunately leaves the former structure intact: 
“The modern reversal shares with the traditional hierarchy the assumption that the 
same central pre-occupation must prevail in all activities of men, since without one 
comprehensive principle no order could be established.”172  
As an example, although the differing political economics of liberal and socialist 
thought ascribe labour a central socio-ontological status for different reasons, both 
schools nonetheless nurture what we may call the modern cult of labour. One need 
only note how discursively adaptable ‘the interests of workers’ is in fitting present 
political orthodoxies - also how any occupation drawing an income must normatively 
frame itself as ‘useful’ and ‘productive’, e.g. as labour. Furthermore, one can readily 
locate scores of associations between discursive elements such as, ‘workers’, 
‘productivity’, ‘societal contribution’ - connected to ‘community’, ‘nation’ and 
‘citizenship’.173 Arendt criticises this ‘cult of labour’ in a variety of captivating ways, 
but most central to present study is that she separates work and action from the 
traditional concept of labour – reconstituting what is means to exist in the world as an 
active life-form (vita-activa). 
Arendt conceptualises the ‘human condition’ as Vita Activa. As we have already 
touched upon with Aquinas, vita activa as a Latin concept is rooted in scholastic 
philosophy/theology. Also, as we already established, Aquinas used the concept with 
only partial respect, and contrasted it in terms of virtue and value to vita 
contemplativa – the (pious) scholarly life. However, Arendt informs us that as a term, 
vita activa originates from Aristotle’s bios politikos. Augustine’s original translation, 
vita negotiosa or actousa more clearly reflected the Greek, ‘social way-of-life’, or the 
‘free’ yet inherently social praxis (secular action) of citizens.174 Arendt tells us that 
the term - again, as with Aquinas – became a category denoting all worldly and 																																																									
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corporeal activity.175 Such activity was acknowledged as being necessary for life, but 
the practical concerns of being in the world suffered as a subordinate ontology in 
relation to the preferred Divine, rife as is was with neo-Platonic idealism and anti-
materialism. Thus, Arendt’s concept of the human condition as vita activa may be 
understood as a reclamation of the term from its scholastic (mis)usage.176 This re-
claimed vita activa is for Arendt dividable into three sub-categories: labour, work, 
and action.  
Arendt proposes an ‘unusual’ labour concept, which is different from what we have 
thus far seen articulated, yet a concept that has nonetheless been implicitly present. 
Arendt conceptualises labour as an activity that ‘corresponds to’ the ‘biological’ and 
‘metabolic necessities’ of life, and through decay also death. Arendt writes that, “The 
human condition of labour is life itself.”177 Labour, in Arendt’s nomenclature, has its 
modern occupational denotations subtracted; what remains takes form on the basis of 
labour’s etymological roots – e.g. physical exertion, bodily hardship, bodily pain, etc. 
A clarifying example of such etymology is present the modern English colloquial 
(and medical) expression for birthing: ‘going into labour.’ Arendt informs us that the 
distinction between labour and work exists in a variety of languages, and is consistent 
in signifying differences between ‘toil’ and ‘fabrication’. For example one can 
observe these differences in Greek: ponein-ergazesthai - in Latin: laborare-
facer/fabricari – in French travailler-ouvrer, in German: Arbeit-Werke (identical in 
most Germanic languages, as in the Danish/Norwegian: arbejde-virke). Thus, labour 
is associated with the actual realities of physical bodies, including but not limited to 
exertion for procuring sustenance.178 As labour is related to the (animal) body, the 
labouring being has in a number of cases ( for example by Marx) been defined as 
animal laborans.179 Crucially, for Arendt labour is cyclical and its effects transient. 
Labour is thus necessary and manifest, but neither praiseworthy nor heroic: 
“… the daily fight in which the human body is engaged to keep the world clean and 
prevent its decay bear little resemblance to heroic deeds; the endurance it needs to 																																																									
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repair every day anew the waste of yesterday is not courage, and what makes the 
effort painful is not danger, but relentless repetition.”180  
Animal laborans is contrasted to the explicitly humanised homo faber, the fabricating 
human.181 Arendt associates work to hands, as is rather overt in the English synonym 
for craft, handiwork – similar to the German for craftsman, Handwerker - and the 
Danish, håndværker. In Arendt’s terms, work refers to the activity that “… 
corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence.”182 Work produces the artificial 
in contrast to the ‘natural’. Work is the activity that ‘houses’ life in its 
‘worldliness’.183 Recalling Benjamin, we might even be inclined to associate this 
usage of work to the de-mystified art (or, Kunst) – also through Greek concepts, 
technê applied to the synthesis (the placing-together) of labour-saving tools and 
mechanical objects (ton ergaleion, ton mekhanikon).184 In this sense, work is a goal 
directed activity concerned with negating the raw and indeed, laborious, conditions of 
life in unaltered nature. Work entails both skilled practice and tacit knowledge. Work 
is the skilled abilities of the hands that all active people do in some form or another – 
all from cobblers to scholars. The later, Arendt reminds us, must also use the working 
skills of the hands for writing, if they are to record and communicate their thoughts.185 
Here, work is not associated to pain and toil, but rather creation, invention, 
composition, etc. Such activities are rather enjoyable insofar as they facilitate a 
playful engagement and are devoid of monotony. In such cases the motivation to 
work requires neither coercion nor incentives – only a sufficient amount of freedom 
from necessity – or as Aristotle would say, scholia. However, both labour and work 
should be able to provide something more than biological cyclicality and clever, 
entertaining artifice. These activities and constructs should enable humans to action - 
a social-political way of being in the world: 
“ … the human artifice must be a place fit for action and speech … of an entirely 
different nature from the manifold activities of fabrication … the measure can be 
neither the driving necessity of biological life and labour nor the utilitarian 																																																									
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instrumentalism of fabrication and usage.”186  
Arendt’s action appears basically to be a reassertion of Aristotle’s bios politikos - the 
praxis of sociality, which is predicated on lexis (speech) – and is contextualised in 
modernity where labour and work are awarded excessive existential importance, and 
where most peoples political life is lived vicariously through the scripted quarrelling 
of elected representatives.187 Action as such rearticulates the human capacity for direct 
political participation, is in Arendt’s definition, the sufficient condition for all 
politics.188 Action “… corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that 
men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”189 For Arendt, both labour and 
work are necessary conditions for enabling a dignified human condition freed from 
base necessity. However, as agent specific activities, labour and work are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a person to live in the human condition. Action, as the 
sufficient condition of politics, is a matter of ‘living among men’ in plurality190. This 
could be understood as similar to the unifying genus and potentiality of what Marx 
would call ‘the social brain.’ In plurality each person initiates new beginnings (as in 
archein, wherefrom ‘rule’ derives). This natality191 adds novelty and distinction to the 
genus. The capacity to ‘begin’ or ‘initiate’ such distinction is what Arendt considers 
(political) ‘freedom.’ This freedom is not ‘freedom of choice’, nor the ‘free will’ – but 
rather the capacity for the new and unexpected. This plurality comes into being 
through speech, which for Arendt is unique in its power to disclose the identity of 
‘who’ rather than ‘what’192:  
“Men can very well live without labouring, they can force others to do labour for 
them, and they can decide to use and enjoy the world of things without adding a 
single useful object to it; the life of an exploiter or slave holder and the life of a 
parasite may be unjust, but they certainly are human. A life without speech and 
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without action, and the other hand (…) is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to 
be a human life because it no longer lives among men.”193 
 
Summary 
 
In Arendt’s perspective, labour as physical exertion is a general fact of life. It may be 
avoided to a degree, and subtracted from certain productive processes, still it remains 
a fact of life – one that many in late modernity actively seek out as a form of leisure – 
as an affirmation and conditioning of their physicality. Work as fabrication produces 
useful objects, the production of which is for some interesting and gratifying – which 
for some is even an art or a hobby. Work as such serves to minimise laborious 
necessity and increase yields – work is useful and makes novel and attractive objects. 
However, the modern normative centrality of labour and work-as-labour has made 
usefulness – or utility – the basic empiric unit of measuring modern social value. This 
is a problem of a de-politicised public realm with a privatised public life. The 
concerns of the oikos displace those of the polis, by for example the economisation of 
politics. People can achieve a vita activa without the necessity of labouring or work; 
by means of the political life of action - living, speaking, and doing together 
constitutes for Arendt a dignified human condition. Work and labour may therefore be 
seen as instrumental. Their loss on account of advanced automated work should not 
result in acedia, or lack of purpose, or alienation from the world or alienation from 
things, or alienation from men and self – but perhaps if and only if animal laborans 
and homo faber can emerge from modernity’s normative privileging of production, 
and re-claim their public voice, agency, and political power, demanding the social 
application of objectified work’s most advanced instruments. The labourer, the 
fabricator, and naturally the contemplator, could act through and with speech to 
articulate the inherent social-existential value of life as ‘living among men’ without 
the compelled intermediacy of products - such would indeed constitute a new 
beginning, seemingly that of radical participatory politics; a way of living a public life 
without the uncompromising prerogative of utility. 
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We shall now transition into our core task: to explore the material conditions of 
employment in our present late-modernity, and address what appear to be the most 
relevant normative implications posed by advanced and accelerative automation. This 
task involves both descriptive and normative considerations, which will be developed 
in parallel. 
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Labour in Late-modernity 
 
The late-modern economic context of employment 
 
As it appears in Marx’s political economy, the economic logic of Capitalism 
incentivises the minimisation of labour costs, which as we have seen may be 
accomplished by cutting labour time, reducing wages, sourcing cheaper materials, 
increasing energy/procedural efficiency etc. The 19th and 20th century labour 
movements (and sociology’s emergence as a distinct science) may in part be 
understood as reactions accelerating social change.194 A significant factor of such 
social change may be related to displacements caused by the technological 
development of labour saving measures.195 An important goal of such labour 
movements was the achievement of some social stability in the context of such rapid 
change. In some contexts this was sought after via redistribution, labour regulation, 
and a ‘social safety net’ in the form of for example unemployment benefits, working 
conditions, healthcare, retirement etc.  
 
The economic theory of John Keynes, which advocated state market intervention 
focused on stimulating growth by bolstering aggregate demand, became in the 20th 
century, the staple of European Social Democratic ‘mixed economies’ and the post-
war New Deal in the United States.196 For a period, this economic policy ran parallel 
to a steep improvement in living conditions and a relatively stable and flexible labour 
market - especially in the Nordic countries.197 This period was marked by reasonably 
consistent economic growth with corresponding improvements in both living 
standards and labour conditions.198 This period of relative social stability began 
change character in the period during and following Thatcher and Reagan’s market 
‘liberalisation’ policies, inspired as they were by the laissez-faire economic theories 
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of Friedrich Hayek, monetarism of Milton Friedman, and the fictions of Ayn Rand.199 
Thatcher formulated in 1987 a statement that would seem to summarise the 
economism of this period: “… there's no such thing as society. There are individual 
men and women and there are families.”200 This period is often described as the ‘neo-
liberal era’, and is characterised by market deregulation, globalisation, ‘free-trade’ 
treaties, ‘austerity,’ or in other words the steady dismantling of social welfare, the 
undermining of trade-union power by out-sourcing labour and mechanical 
automation, the off-shoring of financial Capital, and perhaps most significant, recent 
and insidious development, the financialisation of industrial Capital.201 
 
At present, a great portion of industrial production takes place in ‘developing’ 
countries with low wages.202 The labour markets of the Global North have thus 
shifted character, generating significant service sectors, and knowledge work – where 
a general emphasis is placed on information, experience economy, communication 
and intellectual property rather than material production.203 Regardless of this 
transition, immaterial employment tasks seem to maintain a normative relation to 
industrial forms of labour, where notions of ‘usefulness’ and ‘productivity’ often 
appear in speech regarding immaterial employment.204 
 
 
Technological unemployment revisited 
 
This chapter will address the normative relevance of the re-emergence of Keynes’ 
technological unemployment thesis in regard to advanced digital automation. Of great 
significance to the largely de-industrialised labour economies of the Global North is 
the rapid development of machine learning (ML) and related technologies. Whereas 
computers have for many years now been used for routine cognitive tasks, advances 
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in machine learning now encroach on the human monopoly on non-routine cognitive 
tasks, thus posing novel challenges for labour markets.205 
 
This development has revived Keynes’ previously discredited notion of technological 
unemployment: “… our discovery of means of economising the use of labour 
outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour.”206 Keynes’ notion is 
commonly understood as falsified, by virtue of the economic history following his 
prediction in the 1930’s. This history showed increased productivity (and hence 
profitability) afforded by mechanical automation, which through an overall increased 
real-income, grew industrial economies, lowered prices, increased aggregate demand, 
and eventually created new types of (service) jobs. As a future possibility, 
technological unemployment is in some circles, for example with neoclassical 
economists, commonly dismissed as a ‘Luddite Fallacy.’207  20th century economic 
development provided premises for a type of economic reasoning, which asserts that 
of all technological labour displacement is temporary, as markets have tended to be 
balanced by ‘the capitalisation effect’, which inevitably stimulates job-creation.208 
Thus the despite great human costs affected by such displacements, the Capitalist 
economy has in history been able to adapt. 
However, there are several indications that economic and political awareness of 
automation’s labour market implications is gaining currency. Among other factors, 
this has been influenced by the findings of Frey and Osborne (2013, 2016), whose 
study was prompted by reconsidering Keynes. Also, as mentioned in the introduction, 
the most recent World Economic Forum in Davos (2016) thematically revolved 
around the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, where ‘disruptive technologies’ were of 
central concern.209 Also, in February of 2016, the United State’s White House 
released a macroeconomic report, which noted Frey and Osborne’s investigation on 																																																									
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labour market destabilisation caused by digital and robotic automation. The 
commission recognises the gravity of such an impact, but framed it terms of 
‘temporary displacement’, advocating a conventional re-training approach: 
“These data demonstrate the need for a robust training and education agenda, to 
ensure that displaced workers are able to quickly and smoothly move into new 
jobs.”210  
Unconventionally, and remarkably, there are serious concerns regarding an 
unmanageable technological unemployment voiced by for example Silicon Valley211 
venture capitalists212 and financial sector billionaires such as Bill Gross advocating 
Universal Basic Income (UBI) in Forbes magazine: 
“If more and more workers are going to be displaced by robots, then they will need 
money to live on, will they not? … And if that strikes you as a form of socialism, I 
would suggest we get used to it.”213 
It is interesting to note, that UBI has both advocates and antagonists from the margins 
of all shades of the traditional political spectrum. UBI can thus be structured, 
legitimised and appropriated by both liberal and socialist perspectives. However, UBI 
also remains contentious as it contradicts common normative positions, which are 
manifest in proverbs such as ‘quid pro quo’ and ‘there is no such thing as a free 
lunch’. Common proposed models for financing UBI are equally out of place in both 
liberal and socialist orthodoxies, as some models do not centre on employment 
taxation. Proposals such as Quantitative Easing for People (QEFP)214 (also called 
Helicopter Money), and Monetary Sovereignty215 are both premised on 
unconventional monetary policies. Quantitative easing (QE) is a monetary tool for 
managing financial crisis. In its present form QE consists of central banks issuing 
liquidity injections into the financial sector, by creating ‘money out of thin air’ for 
buying financial sector gilts. This has the goal of stimulating investment, which 
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according to neo-classical economics creates jobs.216 This is logic appears to be 
premised on the ‘trickle down effect’ - the validity of which is highly questionable, if 
not outright repudiated.217 QEFP on the other hand, proposes a similar mechanism, 
with the difference of injecting liquidity directly into people’s accounts, which is 
balanced with some form of bond corresponding to financial sector gilts. Exploration 
of the finer details to such measures is beyond the scope of this study. 
Monetary sovereignty proposes nationalising currencies by re-claiming the state 
monopoly on money creation. Printed currencies (under state monopoly) comprise 
only minor fractions of present day money supplies – where private banks (and any 
other actor with a double-entry/debt ledger) issue (digital) account money-as-debt.218 
This generates unmanageable financial bubbles, undermines state fiscal/monetary 
policies, and essentially taxes the money supply with compound interest rates.219 State 
control over the money supply, would potentially provide greater political leverage 
for any number of projects needing financing, as for example UBI.220  
It could be argued that financing UBI from employment-based taxes would be 
difficult and politically unpopular – and in a situation of structural unemployment, 
this would obviously not be feasible. An alternative could be taxing financial 
transactions (such as the Tobin tax, or ‘robin hood’ tax221), inheritances, Capital 
assets/gains, etc. This may be the most realistic approach, and could also be applied 
so as to minimise inequality and the power of economic elites. Aside from this, 
proposals such as monetary sovereignty also pose interesting methods of financing 
UBI. As speculation, through for example central banks ‘taxing the money supply’ 
with appropriate interest-rates on speculation-free loans and directly redistributing the 
surpluses through UBI. As an unconventional proposal, monetary sovereignty is 
interesting and seems quite promising, although an evaluation is beyond the scope of 
present study. However, present study works from the assumption that 
monetary/economic reform is inadequate as a primary method for achieving social 
stability and redistributive justice. 																																																									
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Aside from such novel schemes, proposals for redefining full-time employment in 
terms of fewer weekly hours are also more and more common, as not only job 
destruction, but also ‘job atomisation’ is a likely consequence of automation.222 This 
phenomenon can be seen as the labour market version of ‘just in time’ 
transport/stocking logistics, meaning full-time jobs are ‘Taylor-ised’ into temporary 
part-time contracts in the so-called ‘gig economy’ - apropos Standing’s Precariat.223 
The gig-economy model is something of an emerging paradigm in US and German 
higher education, where even tenured professorships are increasingly converted into 
short-term adjunct-lecturer contracts, which depending on the lecturers 
‘performance,’ may or may not be renewed.224  
By reducing the definition of ‘full-time’ work to for example 15-30 hours per week, 
higher employment rates could be achieved, and labour unions and unemployment 
insurance structures might be able to relate to late-modern employment tendencies.225 
This could facilitate maintenance of the employment paradigm as the primary 
resource allocation mechanism, while also improving living standards by increasing 
leisure time, and supporting broad inclusion in the normative ‘labour community.’226 
Furthermore, reducing the standard for ‘full time’ employment has indeed been 
successful in the past, where inhuman work hours were reduced to the somewhat 
standard level of eight-hour days. Labour-union demands for a four-hour workday 
without wage cuts were voiced in the early twentieth century.227 This is perhaps even 
more relevant at present. 
 
The Future of Employment 
 
Frey and Osborne approach their case by drawing upon two areas of research. Firstly 
they incorporate a selection of labour economics literature,228 which supplies data for 
specific task content in 701 distinct jobs. This literature examines the historical 																																																									
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impact of computerisation on these jobs in terms of well-defined digitally automatable 
tasks and task sets. However, Frey and Osborne also take Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s 
indications regarding logarithmic expansion of digital/AI capabilities into 
consideration.229 This expansion, Frey and Osborn admit, places their projections in a 
contingent light; which is to say that the tasks and task sets used in their analysis are 
expected to be complimented and potentiated by further, and increasingly 
sophisticated, digital capabilities.230 Secondly, they make use of a range of studies 
that categorise information-based jobs on the basis of susceptibility to digital 
offshoring.231 It is worth mentioning that the offshoring of information-based jobs is 
not only in regard to entire staff positions, but also discrete tasks. For example 
diagnostics via emailing visual data to doctors in the Global South, who are paid 
(much) less for their expertise. Such offshoring entails simultaneous overall 
productivity gains and reduction of workload/time requirements. One implication of 
fully automating information-based tasks is that of a ‘jobless repatriation’ of 
offshored labour.232 This example of medical diagnostics is included, as it has already 
become a field subject to automation. There are at present operative medical 
companies233 comprised solely or primarily of (human) computer engineers and ML 
algorithm software; software that has taught itself to recognise for example cancer 
tumours by analysing visual regularities in complex big data sets .234 Furthermore, the 
diagnostic accuracy of such ML algorithms offers distinct advantages of analytical 
precision, scalability, and elimination of human specific biases, including unstable 
concentration and judgement due to hunger or fatigue.235 Not to open a philosophy of 
science can of worms, but such developments pose interesting questions as to which 
roles humans will maintain as data analysts and puzzle-solving ‘normal scientists.’236 
Human oversight of ML operations would seem appropriate and necessary. However, 
human-ML algorithm collaboration could challenge the high scale viability of (big) 
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‘science as a vocation’237. 
 
What can be automated? 
 
Frey and Osborne relate that digitally automating tasks requires such tasks to be well 
defined and describable/programmable with digital code. This engineering 
requirement has, throughout the existence of computers, placed limitations on what 
types of tasks could be automated, hence the cognitive task categories of routine and 
non-routine.238 Until very recently the abilities of programmers to define such tasks 
and write relevant code has been limited by human capabilities and limitations of 
scale - therefore the automation of cognitive tasks has historically been confined to 
the routine category.239 In 2003, Autor et al., related that tasks such as handwriting 
recognition and driving a car - although simple and routine for humans - to be 
extremely complex and non-routine in terms of rule-based software programing. In 
2004, driving was considered insusceptible to computerisation, as it was at that time 
untenable in terms of defining, amongst other considerations, the complexity of 
irregular traffic behaviour or object recognition by means of manual programing.240  
This has already radically changed. The engineering challenge of translating complex 
non-routine tasks into well-defined problems has become itself quite routine.241 This 
has been largely enabled by two factors, ML algorithms and their utilisation of big 
data242.243  
The implications for the labour market are vast. One such example, which is also 																																																																																																																																																															
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steadily being established as a popular trope, is the implication of automated 
transport. The transport sector, which encompasses jobs such as taxi drivers, truck 
drivers, train operators, etc. is a very large employer. This sector has, in the case of 
taxis, already shown itself to be highly vulnerable to disruption from digital 
technologies, as in the on-going Danish labour market/taxation debate regarding the 
‘sharing economy’ company Über.244 Companies such as Über and Lyft are at present 
involved in massive investments in autonomous taxis, and are orienting their 
competitive strategies towards other autonomous taxi companies. They have stated 
goals for deploying fleets of such vehicles as early as 2017.245 Human operated taxis 
may in this context have a limited future. 
 
Non-routine cognitive automation 
 
The legal sector is another significant example of eminent displacement.246 A large 
portion of legal work is that of ‘discovery’, which basically means the information 
mining of legal documents and case histories. This type of task has historically been 
time consuming and highly important, and thus has providing many legal secretaries 
and young attorneys with employment.247 ML however has massive competitive 
advantages over humans within this field, implying a reduced future of legal work. 
The remaining work will likely centre on oratory skills, persuasive ability and 
charisma.248  
In May of 2016, Ross, the first digital attorney was officially ‘hired’ (leased) for 
bankruptcy law.249 Ross is a ML algorithm built upon IBM’s Watson and, according 
to the company Ross Intelligence, is capable of advanced legal writing and research, 
addressing queries posed natural language.250 
A similar situation applies to the financial sector, where for example automated stock 																																																									
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market trading is already standardised.251 Due to online banking and the diminished 
proportion of physical currency to digital account credit, human bank cashiers have 
almost entirely disappeared, where even the largest banks in a metropolitan city such 
as Copenhagen retain only one or two locations dealing with cash. One might easily 
imagine that a good portion of remaining staff positions in banks - such as low tier 
financial advisors - could also become automated, as the process of affirming rule 
based requirements through the reviewing of standard documents and such as tax 
reports, pay-checks, credit reports etc., for the purpose of loan approval could be 
arguably classified as routine cognitive tasks – even without the sophistication of ML 
algorithms. Again, as with the legal sector, it is perhaps the persuasive skills of selling 
financial products that - for the moment – may be most insusceptible to 
computerisation.252 
Frey and Osborne also comment on the implications of ubiquitous computing through 
the implementation of inexpensive and networked embedded sensors; this is often 
dubbed ‘the internet of things’.253 Significant labour saving efficiency gains can be 
achieved through the usage of such sensors for real-time monitoring, or ‘fault and 
anomaly detection’.254 This has relevance for many matters, ranging from water, gas, 
sewage, and electrical infrastructure and equipment, security and surveillance, 
monitoring of patient condition in hospitals, transport logistics, etc. Furthermore, 
aside from labour saving efficiency gains and reducing maintenance/operational costs, 
embedded sensors serve double purpose of data collection, which enables ML 
algorithms to gain further potential in describing and codifying complex problems. In 
retail, such sensors could make scanning bar-codes and paying with credit/debit cards 
redundant by enabling customers to simply leave a shop with their intended 
purchases, where said sensors would facilitate automatic account deductions.255  
Rapid advances in sophisticated natural language processing and translation 
accessible through inexpensive and distributed user interfaces, e.g. the ‘virtual 
assistants’ of Apple (Siri) and Google (Now) pose to render communication based 																																																									
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tasks and jobs susceptible to automation256 Well-financed efforts to improve and 
refine the linguistic capabilities of these virtual assistants are well under way.257 A 
number of smartphone producing corporations have recently acquired patents for 
novel hardware that will allow powerful ML assistants to operate on mobile 
platforms.258 ML distribution on personal devices would also imply acceleration in 
big data collection, enabling further improvements. An interesting example of late 
involves Silicon Valley/Forest companies hiring poets, whom are employed to assist 
the ML algorithms in identifying poetic language patterns. This work is aimed at 
making virtual assistants not only communicatively functional, but also eloquent, 
adaptive and ‘humanised’ (for example incorporating pause sounds such as ‘hmm’ 
and ‘uhh’).259 
Frey and Osborne also identify the educational sector as susceptible to various forms 
of digitised automation. They exemplify this with reference to the nascent adoption of 
MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses), which consistently generate large data sets 
on e.g. learning patterns, behavioural responses to curricula, etc. Frey and Osborne 
predict that such data sets will enable ML algorithms to for example function as 
personal tutors, and customise curricula to suit individual students.260 It is also 
interesting to note the related field of Intelligent Learning, where games, interactive 
virtual environments and smart materials are employed as ‘bottom up’ and ‘learn by 
doing’ approaches to education, which strive to facilitate and motivate learning, not 
through, but rather as play. The ‘state of play’ referring to the equilibrium state 
between an axis of challenge and competency, thus avoiding boredom and anxiety, 
respectively.261  
Susceptibility to automation through ML applies even to software development.262 
There is an interesting potential in this, where human knowledge of coding might not 
be a future requirement for developing some types of software. Similar to the digital 
lawyer Ross, a person may be able to specify program requirements in natural 																																																									
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language, and allow an algorithm to construct a novel program by positing solutions 
built from components taken from data sets of existing code:  
“Big databases of code also offer the eventual prospect of algorithms that learn how 
to write programs to satisfy specifications provided by a human. Such an approach is 
likely to eventually improve upon human programmers, in the same way that human-
written compilers eventually proved inferior to automatically optimised 
compilers.”263  
To conclude this section - as a nod to Benjamin’s artwork essay – readers should find 
it interesting to note a novel form of digitised art production. Very recently, a team of 
Dutch data scientists from Delft University 3D scanned a wide selection of 
Rembrandt van Rijn paintings held in accessible local collections, and thus generated 
a significantly large data set. They utilised a ML algorithm’s pattern recognition 
capabilities to recognise the signatory style of Rembrandt, establishing detailed 
information on colour, texture, angles, lighting, subjects of representation, etc. They 
then used a 3D printer, loaded with the appropriate oil paint to generate, not an 
accurate reproduction of an existing Rembrandt painting, but rather an entirely new 
idiosyncratic ‘Rembrandt’ painting.264 Similar procedures would seem applicable to 
any variety of art media. Indeed, this has also been done with the compositional idiom 
of Chopin.265 Finally, serious efforts to empirically understand and define both the 
human and computational capacity for creative intelligence are well under way.266 
While such understanding is still in its infancy, the future possibilities for automated 
non-routine cognitive tasks – including those involving creative and social 
intelligence – should not be easily dismissed. 
 
Non-routine physical automation 
 
Aside from the information-based jobs that have thus far been reviewed, Frey and 
Osborne also consider the rapidly developing field of mobile robotics and automated 																																																									
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vehicles. Such technology raises the liability for further industrial, maintenance, 
transport, and service jobs to be technologically out-sourced. Such labour is 
categorised as ‘non-routine manual tasks’.267 They cite a number of examples 
including General Electric’s developments of robots that climb and maintain wind 
turbines and flexible and dexterous surgical robots for medical operations.268 
Logistics and transport are already subject to a variety of robotic automations, and 
this is expected to increase, as in the case of the aforementioned autonomous vehicles 
including taxis, freight, mass-transit etc., but also with warehouse stocking robots and 
forklifts, agricultural vehicles, mining vehicles etc.269  
Technological advances, mass-production scalability and labour/cost saving market 
incentives are driving the cost of robotics consistently down, as much as 10% per year 
with an expected acceleration.270 There are a number of large manufacturing 
companies in like Foxconn in China and Samsung in South Korea, which are avidly 
pursuing robotic automation as a substitute for existing surpluses of cheap labour-
power271. Japanese society, with its notoriously large proportion of ageing population, 
is increasing market demand for robots capable of social, sanitation and health 
functions.272 With significant market incentives, and development of factory tooling 
for mass production, robotics in combination with ML algorithmic AI pose significant 
problems for physical and social employment displacement.  
There are a variety of projects aimed at developing general purpose and low cost 
robots such as Baxter.273 Impressive gains in enhancing robotic dexterity have been 
made by for example Boston Robotics whose robots are capable of adaptive bipedal 
walking and running through irregular terrain.274 Humanoid robots capable of 
emulating a broad range of facial expressions are under development by Hanson 
Robotics – these androids use ML to read human facial expressions, where non-verbal 
cues participate in informing the AI’s communicative comprehension. 275 																																																									
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Remarkably, Hanson Robotics endeavours to equip their robots with the capacity for 
developing ‘empathy’ through verbal and non-verbal experience.276 If these efforts 
prove successful without entailing prohibitive costs, such robots could have social and 
service applications, and thus effect the labour market. 
However, robotics equipment is presently still far more expensive as fixed capital 
investments than information processing software/hardware. High scale applications, 
adaptive general purpose models, and significant price reductions – speculatively 
similar to those of personal computing – would be required before a sufficient 
competitive marginal utility can be achieved by substituting robots for humans for 
physical tasks and those requiring physical presence. Although, on the other hand, as 
such investment already appears to be lucrative for certain high-scale production 
sectors with abundant access to cheap labour, eventual robotic labour substitution in 
the Global North may also occur.277  
 
Contingencies 
 
Frey and Osborne identify a series of factors that constitute ‘engineering bottlenecks’ 
in regard to task specific automation. These factors are, “… perception and 
manipulation tasks, creative intelligence tasks, and social intelligence tasks.”278 They 
propose that a method of partially bypassing such bottlenecks is the well-established 
Fordist/Taylorist logic of reducing integrated processes and task variation into 
discrete reiterations, such as in assembly line production. A contemporary example 
would be the usage pre-fabricated modular components in building construction.279 
Whereas the task model of Autor et al. (2003) proposed a more conservative model of 
automation susceptibility – that of routine tasks – Frey and Osborne suggest that 
computerised and robotic automation can be applied to any type of non-routine task 
that is not limited by engineering bottlenecks.280 They consider the factors of creative 
and social intelligence to pose the greatest challenges to automation engineering, and 																																																									
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therefore jobs that are predicated on such skills have the lowest automation 
susceptibility.281   
Prognosis 
 
Frey and Osborne’s study calculates the susceptibility of 702 occupation types to 
technological displacement. They conclude that 47% of present US jobs are in a high-
risk category for becoming automated within the coming two decades. They do not 
make any attempt at predicting the approximate number of effected positions. They 
do, however, reference estimates that suggest that on a global scale, 140 million full-
time knowledge workers are displaceable by ML algorithms.282 Although many full-
time jobs appear to be readily susceptible to full automation – and the acceleratory 
rate of development seems likely to compound this exposure – Frey and Osborne 
suggest that there are immediate complementarities between types of knowledge work 
which involve creative and social intelligence.283 Frey and Osborne suggest that the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of humans and ML algorithms tend to 
balance each other out.284 In this sense, a ML algorithms advantages in speed and 
scale are complimented by creative/social human intelligence and inter-contextual 
knowledge. Thus humans tutor ML algorithms, helping these to refine 
pattern/correlation recognition and natural language/code authorship capabilities. 
Conversely, algorithms assist humans with expediating services that would previously 
have required an office building filled with assistants working for unthinkable lengths 
of time. One such complementarity appears in the slogan, “Ross lets you get back to 
being a lawyer”285. This is to say that such a ‘virtual assistant’ compliments 
knowledge work by drastically increasing productivity while reducing 
overhead/labour costs and relegating to machinery the tasks that are for humans 
dreary, cyclical, time consuming and extremely inefficient. Such technologies and 
their applications “… change the nature of work across industries and 
occupations.”286  
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This change of the nature of work appears evident in the case of lawyers freed from 
the drudgery of information-mining (or the burden of paying a paralegal’s wages), 
allowing them to concentrate on what they likely consider to be the more engaging 
aspects of their profession. Similar relationships may be readily imagined for other 
knowledge-based occupations. However, despite this immediate complementarity, 
Frey and Osborne’s model suggests that full automation of any type of knowledge 
work would be in theory possible if the challenges posed by engineering bottlenecks 
could be overcome. Although at present this prospect is not looming on the nearer 
horizon, it would seem imprudent to not take it seriously.287  
In conclusion, Frey and Osborne suggest that the majority of workers within the 
sectors of transportation, logistics, office/ administration support, industrial 
production, and within the general category of service, are at in high risk of 
automated displacement. This urgency of risk is not specified beyond the next twenty 
years.288 They also find that high wage (or rather, salaried) occupations and higher 
education have a significant negative relationship to the probability of automation.289 
This relationship is contrasted to the labour economic consequences of nineteenth 
century (mechanical) technological displacement, which primarily stimulated market 
demand for unskilled labourers/low wageworkers within industrial production. The 
earlier stages of computerisation in the twentieth century had a negative impact on 
many middle-income jobs and produced labour market polarisation.290 Frey and 
Osborne’s model predicts that this trend will continue, and that the labour polarisation 
will intensify, as it is primarily low wage/low skill jobs that are in the highest risk 
categories and present day Capital is stimulating a higher demand for higher 
skills/education.291 They predict that low wage/low skill workers will migrate into job 
types that remain impervious to automation due to the factors of creative and social 
intelligence. This implies that low wage/ low skill workers will find their way into 
higher wage/higher skill occupations. Implicitly invoking Keynes, they mention in 
closing that for workers to reallocate into such jobs, they will firstly need to acquire 
the necessary skills through higher education, and do so at a pace that outperforms 																																																									
287 Frey/Osborne, 2013: 41 
288 Frey/Osborne, 2013: 44-45 
289 IBID. 
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technological acceleration and its automation applicability.292  
Let us now move on to discuss all of what we have thus far reviewed within a 
theological materialist/dialectical framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
																																																									
292 Frey/Osborne: 45 
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Discussion 
 
Normative labour in the age of automation: How might we proceed? 
 
 
The following discussion is an attempt at formulating a novel normative synthesis. To 
make sense of this diverse conceptual history I will divide the normative labour 
concept into categories, the first of which will serve as a dialectical starting point. 
Each of these categories involves the two-fold directionality of theological 
materialism. That is, these categories include both a normative-conceptual premise 
and a descriptive-materialist premise. 
 
Thesis 
 
Let us label the first category labour as material necessity thesis. The normative 
labour concept of material necessity is standard within the texts of Aristotle, Seneca, 
Sirach, the Old Testamant/Torah, New Testament, Aquinas, and partially in Luther. 
This concept of labour (and craftsmanship) is incorporated into these distinctive 
traditions in a very similar manner. Much of this, exempting the Old Testament 
myths, may be understood as sharing certain aspects with a common Greek 
genealogy; in multiple sites this results from interpretations of Aristotle, including 
Biblical/theological interpretations inspired/based on Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Aristotle’s definition of Man is a product of metaphysical distinction – that which 
defines Man is that which is conceptually distinctive from other forms of life (zoê): 
this is primarily the praxis of political life (bios politikos). The vita contemplativa 
comes to form the scholastic/medieval incarnation of the ‘higher’ (more pious) human 
faculty. Such forms of life were in both periods only possible for those freed from the 
physical and temporal demands of material necessity. The distinction between forms 
of life associated to bodily-material necessity and those of the ‘higher’ human 
faculties (political life, contemplation, proximity to the divine through scholarship, 
etc.) is relatively constant in surviving texts from the first millennium BCE and 
throughout the European middle ages.  
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Elites such as Aristotle and Seneca owed their freedom from necessity to the 
productive lower social strata – the fact that gentlemen were able to devote time to 
philosophy and politics was only possible due to the toil and practical competencies 
of labourers and workers. We don’t have a direct statement from Seneca on the fact, 
but Aristotle was well aware of this relationship of reliance. However, as we have 
already established, a properly human life (bios) for Aristotle was not constituted in 
the home, working in the field, fishing in a river, hunting in the mountains, sculpting 
in a workshop, or critiquing in a private office. It was constituted through having a 
recognised political voice and ability to directly act within the polis and agora. 
Although Aristotle would hardly have denied that the lower social strata were 
anthropos, we do know that he denied them the status of bios, which defined the truly 
human life-form in contrast to animals and Gods. This was arguable in ancient Greek 
terms, as only those who were free of necessity could have political freedom, and 
political freedom was a condition of ‘the good life’.  
Labour as material necessity in a descriptive sense can be articulated in the following 
way. Physical labour and skilled fabrication were valued primarily in a practical, 
instrumental sense. Labour constituted the activity that directly produced the basic 
material conditions of life. Labour as such was the physical exertion related to 
agriculture, cyclical household upkeep, and reproductive labour, moving heavy 
objects, mining stone, digging holes, etc. Domesticated animals complemented such 
labour. Fabrication/craftsmanship served the purpose of potentiating labours energies 
through the construction of clever apparatuses, such as wheels, levers, water screws, 
cranes, and other basic tools. Craftsmanship and labour in conjunction were directly 
responsible for constructing homes, cities, roads etc. The ergon thêtikon, a banausos 
technê, Roman plebeians and ‘barbarian’ slaves were responsible for erecting the 
beautiful statues, reliefs, and temples that are appropriately associated to these ancient 
cultures. Artisans also produced the sophisticated items that enabled urban ‘finer 
living’. Although it is unavoidably true that each of these cultures were distinctive 
from each other, in philosophy, religion, politics, economy, etc., we may nonetheless 
reduce such differences in the lens of historical materialism: the labour and work of 
slaves, the un-free, and other social groups compelled by necessity, were the cogs of 
the ancient economic wheel. A great deal of corporal force and coercion was 
necessary to maintain this production. Although it would seem to be likely that rigid 
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social-religious norms as described by e.g. Aristotle and Aquinas also played their 
role in keeping the social hierarchy intact – texts written by for example slaves and 
cobblers describing an internalised social hierarchy and work-ethic are not at our 
disposal – so the extent of this coercion remains mere speculation. We may in fairness 
state that a form of automation existed in the ancient/medieval world, although it 
required the subjugation and diminution of sentient human life – in Marx’s terms, this 
form of automation required alienated labour.  
 
Anti-thesis 
 
The contradiction of this thesis may be called the productivity as source of human 
value anti-thesis. Although the complete normative contradiction of this thesis 
appears firstly in our material with Marx, it would seem that Luther’s thinking - to use 
Kuhn’s terms - contained the ‘anomaly’ that initiated this ‘paradigm shift’. Luther 
rejected the traditional Catholic spiritual-ontological hierarchy by re-constituting the 
spiritual and worldly estates. This re-configuration effectively de-stabilised the 
hierarchy between the vita activa and vita contemplativa within Protestant thought. 
The ‘higher’ human faculties are communalised and are independent from ‘freedom 
from necessity’ and in fact bound to vocation as a form of Protestant sacrament. This 
allowed Luther to conceive of all worldly vocations and stations as equal peers of the 
spiritual estate. He did however maintain a classic metaphysical dualism in the form 
of worldly existence as different from and inferior to the afterlife. Good order and 
social stability in a normatively demoted transitory existence became thus a central 
Protestant concept. Of great importance to the reversal of the labour concept was 
Luther’s trade income-to-labour ‘conversion formula’, which he ultimately rendered 
non-applicable through the individualisation of spiritual atonement. Luther clearly 
rejected his own approximation of the subjective theory of value – and with his 
formula conceived that legitimate object-value and derived income could be definable 
in terms of labour. However, unlike Aquinas’ earlier version of this value ‘conversion 
table’, Luther judged such legitimacy to be a private spiritual issue, which effectively 
rendered his critique useless for the purposes of developing an egalitarian social 
norm. Luther clearly understood, and indeed succinctly formulated, the centrality of 
anti-wealth and egalitarian-emancipatory values within Christian doctrine. However, 
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on account of his religiosity and contempt of worldly life and all things corporeal, he 
did follow this to its logical conclusion. That conclusion was understood by 
Feuerbach through his anthropological interpretation of Christianity, and clearly 
expressed by Marx in materialist terms. 
In Marx’s conception, labour is understood as the most basic activity of human life. 
Labour produces the means to life and is the subject’s primary way of relating to the 
object world. In this sense, the production of objects directly reflects the subject’s 
way of being in the world. Therefore, labour for wages in the service of private 
property/Capital obscures and corrupts this relation, for example by producing its own 
alienated life. Marx thus proposes the secular emancipation that Luther stopped short 
of.  As we have established, Marx’s vision of labour’s emancipation was associated to 
the labour-saving capabilities of machines, that is, of automation. However, as Arendt 
points out, Marx fails to conceptualise what form of meaningful life should follow 
such emancipation. Quite paradoxically, it would seem, Marx uses the phrase 
‘emancipated labour.’ If machines were to be applied socially, reducing all necessary 
effort in an emancipated society to an absolute minimum, the normative evaluation of 
life in relation to material production and utility would be less relevant. Obviously, 
Marx did not seek recourse in religion or the contemplative life, but neither did he 
imagine the resurgence of the political realm as at least a partial substitution for the 
ubiquity of the economic realm. In this, Marx falls short. Without intending to detract 
from Marx’s eminent scholarship, it should be said that Marx’s preoccupation with 
production and its mono-directional determinism entailed a positivist approach to 
politics. Arendt criticises Marx for this and suggests that following aspects of Marx’s 
insights to their logical conclusion implies the re-politicisation of the human 
condition. In this sense, Arendt provides us with a key normative conceptual 
framework, with which a novel synthesis may be formed. 
The productivity as source of human value anti-thesis may be in a descriptive sense 
related as follows. Marx cites a number of sources that describe of mid-nineteenth 
century industrial production and related social issues. While some aspects of his 
description are disputable, certain general features of production from this period are 
both uncontroversial and well established. The three key factors in this context are 
Capital accumulation, industrialisation and urbanisation. Various political 
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philosophers in the preceding centuries had already established widely accepted 
theoretical justifications for private property and related liberal concepts of negative 
freedom (freedom from state intervention in private individual’s ‘pursuit of 
happiness’). These legal notions became definitive elements in bourgeois conceptions 
of political freedom. Following the ascendance of the mercantile class, these notions 
came to enjoy state enforcement. Private Capital became an increasingly 
unchallenged factor of power, and Capitalist societies became mere amalgamations of 
private entities – of households. As Marx has informed us, persons and groups 
without Capital had little recourse but to sell their labour to such private entities, 
whom following market logic sought to pay to the lowest possible wage that would to 
maintain a surplus of labour-power. At the same time labour-saving machinery was 
responsible for drastically increasing production, drastically reducing the necessary 
labour time/energy to manufacture products. This, as Benjamin contends, led to the 
‘crisis of overproduction and the lack of markets’, which found its (temporary) 
solution not only through industrial war as Benjamin argued, but also through another 
form manifestation of the ‘aesthetisation of politics’, e.g. where spending money is 
equated with self-actualisation and the mass media’s advertising creates markets for 
consumption. Nothing in this economic model can function without demand. For all 
instances of productivity gains enabled by technology, there has been corresponding 
labour displacements followed (eventually) by reintegration. For the purposes of 
Capital, displaced labour-power means heightened competition, cheap-labour surplus, 
and thus entrepreneurial opportunities (the ‘capitalisation effect’ in a nutshell). The 
displaced workers of the twentieth century did tend to be reabsorbed into employment 
roles – although such transitions were often enough going from unionised industrial 
jobs into new and ‘innovative’ Taylorist models such as the fast-food industry. Thus, 
mechanised automation technologies changed the nature of labour, freeing labour 
from its purposeful relationship to necessity. However as normative property relations 
were maintained, the situation became analogous to Benjamin’s work of art: that the 
emancipatory (revolutionary) potential of such technology remained limited to that of 
challenging traditional conceptions of labour and work. 
To summarise the productivity as source of human value anti-thesis, let us relate back 
to Aristotle: one could say while receiving wages under private contract, people 
suspend their political citizenship becoming mere oikotês (household servants), within 
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private entities. A standard conception of labour relations within liberal democracies 
revolves around the notion of freedom of contracts. A classic liberal position 
maintains that everyone has the free right to accept or decline employment. Because 
of this ‘freedom of choice’, a free labour market is construed as non-coercive. This is 
an unconvincing argument, as there are not any viable alternatives to sustaining 
oneself in labour market. In a ‘modernised’ welfare state characterised by austerity 
politics, unemployment income is dependant on labour market availability and 
willingness to take whatever work is offered, even if the terms and conditions are 
deemed unacceptable. Declining a job offer is done at personal peril, as one may 
loose the right to a welfare income. What is worse still, is the situation that dominant 
social norms enforce identification with employment/occupation: the meaning of 
contemporary questions such as ‘what do you do (for a living)?’ so often refers to the 
truth-value of ‘who are you?’. Similarly, children are encouraged to consider from the 
earliest age, ‘what they want to be when they grow up’. In this sense, the 
consequences of unemployment or ‘uselessness’ naturally entail material deprivation, 
however far more serious than this – to re-purpose Arendt’s thoughts – becoming 
‘useless’ under the normative God of Utility is to ‘become dead to the world’ and 
‘dead to one’s self’ – an alienated Other - a non-person - or as Agamben might say, 
‘bare life’ – mere zoê. 
 
Synthesis & Conclusion 
 
This synthesis takes its form based on the premise of accepting that sophisticated and 
accelerative automation technologies are in the process of becoming the dominant 
‘mode of production’. In a material sense, this technological paradigm shift appears as 
poised to contradict both the practical and normative feasibility of maintaining the 
productivity as source of human value anti-thesis. Let us call this, the automation as 
means to a social-political life synthesis. 
It has hopefully been adequately established that the development of technological 
capabilities had a rather linear character in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth 
centuries. With the exception of twentieth century early computing, these 
technologies related to mechanical (re)production, and were labour saving in the 
sense of physical exertion and wage-time. These potentiation rates being linear 
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correspond to a somewhat gradual implementation of productive fixed Capital, 
allowing time for social-economic adjustments. Labour-market equilibrium did tend 
to be re-established in periods following displacement. However, even at this linear 
rate, there were very significant human costs (economic ‘externalities’), which had a 
relation of correspondence to massive social unrest. However, with the present 
digital-technological exponential acceleration rates, such a ‘comfortable’ period of 
market dictated social adjustment would not seem probable. If Keynes’ technological 
unemployment thesis proves to be true - and the present study suggests that it should 
be taken seriously – untenable rates of structural unemployment could arrive quicker 
than a human intuition might expect. The present study does not aim at predicting 
when, how, or how much. Nonetheless, there may be a certain societal pain threshold 
regarding the scope and quality of an unbearable structural unemployment. Crossing 
such a ‘boiling point’ without having a contingency plan could be hazardous.  
As mentioned earlier, there are a number of proposals for such contingency plans, 
some of which are directly related to advanced automation. The UBI proposal may 
have a direct effect on the economic issues related to demand, and a range of obvious 
human issues. UBI is gaining interest in a variety of circles and appears to have a 
certain momentum. Assuming that UBI could be sustainably financed, and be 
structured in a socially beneficial way. There arise a number of interesting questions 
as to how people might spend their time. UBI is proposed as a socio-economic 
‘foundation’ rather than a ‘safety net’ and is intended to incentivise work and risk-
taking in entrepreneurship, while removing the (disciplinary) factors of fear and 
uncertainty. If advanced automation replaces most human efforts in repetitive, boring 
and toilsome tasks, and generates a material abundance requiring only marginal input 
from humans, people could potentially still spend their time and efforts doing a 
number of useful as well as socially-politically valued activities. Let us start with a 
form of labour. A massive amount of affective labour has always existed in the world, 
and it has historically been the uncompensated and undervalued labour of women, yet 
it has irrefutably enabled political and economic society’s functionality – in fact its 
very existence.293 The value of and necessity of caring for people, for children and the 
elderly, has always suffered from underestimation – one need only compare the 																																																									
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contemporary incomes and social prestige of for example nurses, child care workers, 
and housekeepers to those of for example doctors, lawyers, and financiers. Even in 
the event that care-giving robots becoming available, it is likely that real human 
interaction would be preferable for most persons. If it is true that our general quality 
of social relationships has suffered from the dictates of productive acceleration-
societies, there could be a great deal socialising and caring to catch up with.294 In the 
case of work, there would be obvious recourses for people to learn various crafts, and 
produce artisanal goods on their own volition. As in William Morris’ imagination 
people could spend time making use objects as ‘works of art’ without the need for 
incentives 295. This would undoubtedly have intrinsic value for the people doing the 
creating, but also would be of interest to others. Similarly, is the potential impact of 
automation on collaborative practices of open-source/peer-learning cultures in for 
example hacker/maker spaces and fab-labs. A great deal of technological/product 
innovation has always taken place as tinkering. A convincing example of this is the 
mountain bike, which incidentally is the highest grossing bicycle type in the US.296 It 
was not invented by a group of specialist protégés in a corporate ‘innovation’ lab who 
were hoping for a patent – rather it was the gradual product of a distributed tinkering 
culture and knowledge sharing in a community of enthusiasts. There are multiple 
examples of research areas being open-sourced to the tinkering community as ‘citizen 
science’ projects. Harvard for example has open-sourced a basic kit for developing 
‘soft robotics’, which incorporates the amateur friendly Arduino platform for 
programming purposes.297 There are also scores of such tinkerers doing work with 
bio-tech – the so called bio-hackers – who most often reproduce harmless but highly 
instructive procedures such as isolating and cultivating bioluminescent cells; some 
even dabble with CRISR/CAS9 and splice genomes!298 There is a massive amount of 
human potential in such, ‘do it ourselves’ maker-cultures, tinkering and collaborative 
knowledge practices. One could be excused for imagining the possibilities of such 
work becoming widely distributed, and done for the sake of curiosity and local use-
value rather as a salaried profession.  																																																									
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Of equal importance to these socio-economic considerations are the normative 
questions of automation. In order to accomplish this I must venture out into a fictional 
yet plausible thought experiment.  
Let us image that the threshold of unmanageable technological unemployment is 
reached in 2035 – let us base this on Frey and Osborne’s findings and say that all job 
types in the high risk category indeed become automated. The structural 
unemployment is at 47% and rising. However, let us assume that Capitalists elites 
have not spent their time pondering over Thomas Malthus and considered the relative 
merits of controversial positions in population ethics. Certain time honoured liberal 
and conservative principles were put into parenthesis and tactical concessions were 
made i.e. the situation is under control as adaptive measures have been taken (such as 
UBI). Fortunes are retained and concentrated, as is their leverage in electoral 
‘politics’. People are trying to adjust. Some retain their occupations, as they involve 
forms of creative and social intelligence and they have become quite savvy in 
cooperating with ML platforms. Many of the remaining employed think that the 
sudden unemployment is explainable as a structural issue – they have unemployed 
friends who were formerly diligent and productive. Some of the remaining employed 
view the new situation as unfair, and emphasise that working people shouldn’t be 
forced to pay for others. Some think that the unemployment is explainable by lack of 
responsibility – that lazy young people made poor decisions in their career choices. 
Such people think that everyone should have to work, even if there aren’t any jobs – 
they write opinion pieces in newspapers explaining as much. Some people try to 
invent new business models, which would have use for humans – they are motivated 
by making money, but also believe in the idea of helping people re-acquire a purpose 
in life and the self respect that follows a professional career. A portion of the 
unemployed are bored, unmotivated, and feel that they lack purpose - others enjoy the 
freedom and pursue creative and/or entrepreneurial projects that they never found the 
time or energy to develop. Most unemployed keep an eye on sporadic gig-job apps, 
both for something to do and to make some extra money – however most of these gigs 
entail some form of specialised skill or ability – or concession of dignity. The 
unskilled seek out education and training, as do most others. 
This situation is constructed as plausible outcome, a vision of an automated future 
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without any significant corresponding normative changes. In some senses this could 
be considered an optimistic outcome. Let us now consider a model on how the 
normative configuration of this society might adapt to the new technological reality. 
This model is assembled from the conceptual fragments we have derived within 
present study’s analysis. 
It would seem that a society such as ours, one that is characterised by the ubiquity of 
the economy - where anything claimable as having value must be describable in terms 
of usefulness - would be in a state of normative shock following the sudden 
‘uselessness’ of half the population. If this situation is thought of as a social 
pathology, then what are the possibilities for treatment? Drawing back on Benjamin, I 
would simply say: the social application of our best technologies – with 
corresponding normative adaption.  
Before we end, let us consider one final example. A common present-day 
understanding of value creation relates as follows: that individuals and private 
companies produce value and wealth in the private domain. Only by means of state 
intervention is this private wealth redistributed into the public domain (or collection 
of individuals, if one pleases). However, one may also posit that wealth and value 
creation are produced in the public domain and then extracted into the private domain. 
The present study is sympathetic with the later view, but how can this be 
demonstrated and thereby justified? This may be answered by referencing the 
‘innovative’ business model of two very wealthy corporations - Google and 
Facebook. Both companies have successfully become almost symbolic of the Internet. 
Neither company produces value-enabling content. These companies are involved in 
many projects, but the core service they provide is that of search algorithms and the 
channelling of traffic through their massive servers.299 The value of these sites is 
derived from the socially motivated communication of users, who voluntarily fill the 
sites with both content and presence, which is then commoditised through for 
example advertisement and applications based on big data collection. Furthermore, 
neither company was responsible for constructing the underlying infrastructure on 
which they operate – the Internet – indeed it was pieced together through distributed 
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efforts over a period of time, emanating from an originally publically funded 
governmental program. One could view the Internet and the value that is within its 
network, not only as an analogy to the social-political ontology, but rather as its 
partial physical embodiment. In the very beginning of the post-industrial era, Thatcher 
could claim that ‘there is no such thing as society’, and this was at the time, largely a 
matter of conceptual metaphysics: however, in our digital times, this can be also be 
evaluated by positive means. One could hardly get away with claiming that ‘there is 
no such thing as the internet, only users and websites’ – that would be nonsense. It is 
the very existence and functionality of the network that via facilitation enables web 
sites to collect value through user participation. Furthermore, the Internets functional 
logic can hardly be theorised as the spontaneous consequences of an exogenous 
invisible hand – rather it is a consequence of gradual piecemeal human design and 
active social participation. 
One could extend this analogy and claim that these giant Internet monopolies have 
certain metaphysical similarities to the network-facilitating function of banks. Every 
person using currency participates in endowing money with value, the value of which 
is reducible to a matter of confidence and belief. Belief and confidence can be 
tokenised and thus systematised in many other ways than merely through economic 
currency. Novel initiatives can be organised and executed without the facilitation of 
concentrated economic Capital. Socially and materially valuable human activities can 
and are conducted without being necessarily embedded in the employment system. 
An alternative network-exchange matrix can be established within the social-political 
ontology. If we accept that companies like Google and Facebook are poster children 
of our post-industrial information/technology based economies, and even their 
business model places central value on human presence in the social network – indeed 
even encouraging what some call ‘prosumtion’ (as opposed to consumption) – would 
it not seem forthcoming to adjust the social-normative paradigm of human dignity and 
value being accessible only through material utility? How could such a demand be 
articulated in social-philosophic terms? 
The present study’s synthesis points to the following: such a demand can be 
articulated through the social-normative insistence on dignified human life, where our 
best technologies – the products of ‘the social brain’ - are applied socially. That their 
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functionality and mass-scale affordances are allowed to save time and labour, but 
serving the polity – not the privatised economy. Automation technologies should be 
applied so as to enable a concept of citizenship involving freedom from material 
necessity – and they should be conducive to collaborative and autonomous creativity. 
This polity should insist on freedom from domination, and produce an 
epistemologically enriched capacity for participation in power through speech and 
action in the real daily public realm of politics. Not politics in the sense of the 
‘representative’ oligarchies of today, who are incapable of and unwilling to challenge 
financial Capital’s interests, not even for mobilising efforts to deal with existential 
threats such as climate change.300 That which is lacking in the society from our 
thought experiment is an internalised understanding of human value in the context of 
human sociality, and the awareness of the fact that our best technologies should be 
applied to support this. 
 
Epilogue  
 
fiat ars, publice agat, salvifcem mundum 
 
Although this study’s title names the present and encroaching ‘Age’ after automation, 
naming it ‘the age of intersecting crises’ would probably be more nuanced and fitting. 
My imagination is saturated with visions of conflicting and contradictory future 
scenarios: on the one hand of technologically enabled abundance in a resilient post-
scarcity polity, environmental sustainability, decentralised and radically participatory 
democracy, the socialisation rather than weaponisation of technology, social justice 
and security, the cultivation of collaborative practices in the sciences and arts, the 
freedom of regional movement, massive investment in collective infrastructure, and 
so forth. On the other hand, I anticipate both real and engineered scarcity, inequality, 
incessant poverty, failed states fostering mass migrations towards electrified fences, 
dead and acidified oceans writhing with crude oil and micro-plastic waste, 
omnipresent surveillance, flooded and depopulated coastal cities, drought and 
desertification, temperatures exceeding five degrees of pre-industrial levels, limitless 																																																									
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privatisation, patent trolls and corporate secrecy obstructing peer dialogue and 
learning, the utter instrumentalisation of social and human sciences, mass 
unemployment, ‘surplus’ populations, and winner-take-all neo social Darwinian 
competition. 
Capitalism reduces all human affairs into economics and ‘externalities’ – the radical 
polity responds by politicising technology and re-politicising human life. 
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